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ABSTRACT 
The federal government holds an inherent responsibility to report on its financial 
management operations and consequent outcomes. The passage of the Chief Financial 
Officers Act of 1990 and subsequent fiscal reform legislation set forth a mandate for 
fmancial accountability through implementation of an integrated fmancial management 
system, preparation and audit of consolidated federal fmancial statements, and institution 
of government-wide strategic planning and performance measurement. The Department 
of Defense (DoD) remains the predominant noncompliant agency, and in 1999 
acknowledged that archaic data feeder systems never intended to comply with accounting 
standards or integrate with fmancial management systems were the major obstacles to 
conformity. DoD estimates that 80 percent of relevant fmancial management data comes 
from these critical nonfinancial feeder systems. This thesis estimates the cost and 
progress of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) nonfinancial feeder system 
compliance within the Department of the Navy (DoN), which controls approximately 50 
percent of DoD PP&E assets. Objective assessments of Real and Personal Property 
initiatives set a framework for examination of alternative strategies to overcome 
pervasive National Defense Asset reporting deficiencies. This thesis proposes a DoN 
strategic initiative to define, account for, and report National Defense PP&E in the 
absence of relevant federal accounting standards. 
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The United States Federal Government carries an inherent responsibility to report 
on its actions and their subsequent results and outcomes, as it exercises its power only 
through the consent of the governed. Federal fman_cial reports represent essential data for 
governmental accountability to the public and its elected representatives, as well as for 
planning and executing government functions to the nation's greatest benefit. The 
establishment of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), in 
conjunction with the passage of federal fmancial management reform legislation over the 
course of the past decade, beginning with the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 
1990, laid the groundwork for the preparation and publication of such reports, in the form 
of standardized and audited federal financial statements. 
The F ASAB builds upon established accounting standards to set others that serve 
the government's unique organization and the information requirements of report users. 
Such standards defme recognition and measurement of most assets, liabilities, expenses, 
and revenues, as well as the disclosure of related information such as the input of 
resources used by the government, the government output of goods and services, and the 
outcome and impact of governmental programs. They also create a process for 
evaluating the existing financial reporting systems of the federal government . and for 
considering new standards and systems to enhance accountability and decision-making in 
a cost-effective manner. 
1 
Although the Department of the Treasury has prepared the executive agencies' 
consolidated financial statements of the federal government since fiscal year (FY) 1997, 
subsequent audits repeatedly demonstrate critical problems from fundamental 
recordkeeping errors, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls. Material 
deficiencies surfacing during the auditing process thus far render the federal fmancial 
statements unreliable as sources of information for accountability or decision-making. 
The 24 reporting executive agencies do not share equal responsibility for the serious 
concerns addressed in the General Accounting Office (GAO) audits, however; the 
fmancial management deficiencies of the vast Department of Defense (DoD) constitute 
the greatest ob~truction to receiving an unqualified audit opinion on the consolidated 
fmancial statements. 
The Department of the Navy (DoN), as a major component of DoD, also remains 
unable to emerge successfully from the audit process. Without rephrasing the broad 
deficiencies noted above, it may be concluded that after a decade of preparation and 
several years of practice, the DoN continues to experience difficulty determining to 
required standards how much money it spends, what it spends money on, what property it 
has, where the property goes, or how much the property is worth. Still, for DoN 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) assets, the current state of failure-in-compliance 
represents a significant and incremental improvement over the preceding years, and 
material progress continues in addressing longstanding, pervasive deficiencies, with 
major systems and process reengineering initiatives proposed and underway. 
Currently, the priority for DoN fmancial management reform resides with the 
efforts to achieve compliance in nonfmancial feeder systems. The inclusion of such 
2 
feeder systems, the source of an estimated 80 percent of the data required to meet federal 
reporting requirements, is vital because proper and consistent asset accountability 
necessarily precedes effective financial management. In the Congressionally mandated 
rush to establish fiscal accountability, however, the necessity of capturing the cost of 
PP&E nonfmancial feeder system compliance has not been adequately addressed. In the 
current period of increasing Congressional oversight and fiscal constraint, such an 
assessment would serve to illustrate the price of compliance in terms of past and present 
reform strategy and initiatives, and would allow for an objective comparison of both the 
benefits of future success and subsequent reform proposals. Through the additional 
examination of current progress, it would also provide potential insight into the eventual 
total costs of full compliance or alternative prioritization strategies that achieve 
compliance at a lesser cost or with greater efficiency and effectiveness. 
This thesis undertakes the effort of assessing the price and progress of the current 
DoN PP&E nonfmancial feeder system compliance initiatives in response to Federal 
Financial Reporting Requirements resulting from reform legislation initiated with the 
CFO Act of 1990. Through a comparison of implementation strategies and compliance 
initiatives in the major PP&E asset categories of Real Property, Personal Property, and 
National Defense Assets, the results will hopefully provide a perspective on past and 
present strategy and achievement that will improve future initiatives and results in 
addressing the fmancial management challenges yet to be overcome. 
B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 
This thesis first examines the legislative imperatives for financial management 
reform and compliance with federal financial reporting requirements, illustrating the 
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significance of nonfmancial feeder systems to their success. It then scrutinizes the DoD 
compliance status and strategy for PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems, perhaps the most 
critical of such systems, focusing on functional concepts and PP&E definitions. 
Narrowing scope once more, this thesis addresses the specific price and progress of 
PP&E compliance initiatives within DoN, utilizing the Real Property and Personal 
Property implementation strategies as a comparative framework with which to examine 
National Defense Asset nonfinancial feeder system reform. Within this context, the 
thesis fmally proposes conclusive definitions, and accounting and reporting standards, 
which will permit the timely, decisive implementation of National Defense Asset 
compliance measures. 
The primary objective of this thesis entails answering the following question: 
What are the price and progress of the Department of the Navy's current initiatives to 
achieve compliance in PP&E nonfmancial feeder systems with Congressionally-
mandated Federal Financial Reporting Requirements? 
Secondary objectives consist of answering the following questions, all serving as 
precursors to the primary objective except the last, which arises as a consequence: 
I) What collective legislation constitutes the Congressional mandate for 
financial management reform, and of what significance are these 
imperatives? 
2) What is the status of consequent fiscal reform in the DoD? 
3) What are the purposes, critical functions, and deficiencies of DoD 
nonfmancial feeder systems that render them so significant to fiscal 
reform? 
4 
4) What are the definitions, and accounting and reporting standards, for DoD 
PP&E? 
5) What are the scope and the status of the DoD compliance initiatives for 
Real Property, Personal Property, and National Defense, major PP&E 
asset categories? 
6) What is the DoN organizational strategy for achieving nonfmancial feeder 
system compliance? 
7) What is the current situation and comparative progress achieved thus far 
under the respective Real Property, Personal Property, and National 
Defense PP&E categories? 
8) What costs does DoN incur which cannot be specifically assigned to one 
of the nonfinancial feeder system compliance initiatives? 
9) What is the price of DoN PP&E nonfmancial feeder system compliance 
when projecting funding requirements for implementation and 
sustainment? 
1 0) How have projected funding requirements varied within DoN over the past 
year for PP&E nonfmancial feeder system compliance? 
11) What measures must be taken to overcome the lack of progress and the 
extant controversy in National Defense Asset PP&E, and to efficiently and 
effectively implement the compliance initiative? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To achieve these objectives, the methodology employed in this thesis consisted of 
archival, opinion, and analytical research elements to obtain the most comprehensive, 
5 
current, and relevant information pursuant to the dynamic, mounting imperative for 
federal fiscal reform. Archival aspects included a review of all official applicable 
Congressional legislation and executive agency regulation, concurrent with a search for 
pertinent literature sources among books, professional journals, public hearing reports, 
and various electronic media and storage systems. This eventually focused upon 
documentation concerning DoD and DoN nonfmancial feeder systems, as well as the 
status of ongoing compliance initiatives. 
Opinion research entailed travel to Washington, D.C., and meetings with various 
DoN financial management officials involved with coordinating and executing 
implementation strategy and compliance initiatives. Foremost among these officials were 
Mr. Gregory Barber of the DoN Organization Management and Infrastructure Team 
(DONOMIT), Mr. Warren Pfeiffer and Mr. William Aldrich of the Office of Financial 
Operations (FMO), and Ms. Gladys Commons, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller). Their invaluable expertise permitted 
a perspective on current and future feeder system challenges unobtainable elsewhere, as 
well as access to information otherwise unpublished. 
With the establishment of a comprehensive knowledge base, analytical research 
included the conceptualization and use of Real Property and Personal Property price, 
progress, and systems structure as a framework for comparison to study National Defense 
Asset PP&E. This permitted analysis of each major asset category, and National Defense 
Assets in particular, on qualitative and limited quantitative levels, as data allowed, in the 
pursuit of thesis objectives. 
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D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Following the introductory background 
and content information in Chapter I, Chapter II examines the legislative imperatives for 
fmancial management reform and compliance with federal financial reporting 
requirements, as well as the consequent current state of fiscal reform in DoD. 
Chapter III· scrutinizes the DoD compliance status of and strategies for PP&E 
nonfinancial feeder systems, the most critical system obstacles to short-term compliance 
with federal accounting and reporting standards, focusing on system functional concepts 
and PP&E definitions. It first introduces the three major asset categories of Real 
Property, Personal Property, and National Defense Asset PP&E, in the context of 
Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards. 
Chapter IV narrows the scope once more, and endeavors to separately evaluate 
the progress achieved thus far under each of the DoN PP&E nonfmancial feeder system 
initiatives, in the context of both the differing system deficiencies in the asset categories 
and the Navy's organizational strategy for confronting them. The progress of the DoN in 
executing these fmancial management reforms reflects DoD Implementation Strategies 
and specific Navy priorities and organizational structures. 
Chapter V considers those costs, again from a DoN perspective, incurred in the 
implementation and sustainment of the initiative outcomes. It also addresses the levels of 
funding committed thus far to the implementation strategies, which are not necessarily 
aligned with relevant cost projections. This chapter first examines the intricacies of 
federal funding and cost accounting practices, however, to illustrate the limitations to full 
cost estimates for specific compliance programs. 
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Chapter VI consists of a thesis summary, conclusions, and recommendations for 
further research. Notably, arising from the conclusions, this thesis finally proposes 
conclusive definitions, and accounting and reporting standards, which will permit the 
timely, decisive implementation ofNational Defense Asset compliance measures. 
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ll. LEGISLATIVE ACTION & DOD RESPONSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
A comprehensive examination of the significance of nonfmancial feeder systems 
cannot proceed outside the context of congressional legislation enacted over the past 
decade mandating fiscal reform in the federal government. With the passage of the CFO 
Act in 1990 and subsequent financial management legislation throughout the next nine 
years, Congress required federal agencies to incrementally adjust their operations to 
reflect businesslike or corporate private sector practices, with substantial emphasis on 
proper reporting of financial data and production of auditable financial statements. The 
1990 establishment and subsequent evolution of the F ASAB also merit discussion as a 
relevant consequence of legislative action. Other major legislation that delineates 
fmancial management reform requirements includes the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) of 
1994, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996, and the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 1998. 
The Acts exist as interrelated, if not integrated, legislative initiatives to clarify our 
accounting systems and provide Congress, federal managers, and the American taxpayers 
with superior financial information and demonstrated accountability for the use of tax 
revenues. Taken as a whole, the mandates constitute an enormous challenge to the 
federal agencies, and the DoD in particular, in the focused efforts to achieve the high 
standards now expected in federal financial management. This chapter examines these 
legislative imperatives for financial management reform and compliance with federal 
9 
financial reporting requirements, as well as the consequent current state of fiscal reform 
in DoD. 
B. CIDEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS ACT OF 1990 
With the passage of the CFO Act (Public Law 101-576), Congress set out a 
framework for general and financial management reform. It required the establishment 
of integrated federal agency accounting and fmancial management systems as the central 
component of that framework [Ref. 1 :p. 44], to include the publication of federal 
fmancial reports and the codification of internal controls. The Act also established 
federal financial management leadership, positioning the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Deputy Director for Management as the highest official responsible for 
federal financial management, forming the OMB Office of Federal Financial 
Management, and, most significantly, instituting chief financial officer positions in the 
operating federal departments and agencies. 
These chief financial officers became responsible for the preparation of auditable 
fmancial statements to be consolidated with those of other departments and agencies, thus 
making them responsible in-part for the successful audit of the federal government 
fmancial report. Such financial statements required disclosure of departments' and 
agencies' financial positions and results of operations to publicize accountability over 
assets, allocation of taxpayer resources, and managerial performance for Congress, 
department and agency executives, and the public. The Act specifically tasked ten 
departments and agencies with producing auditable financial statements for FY 1996. 
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C. FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD 
Also in 1990, the establishment of the F ASAB resulted from a joint initiative 
among the government's financial principals- the Department of the Treasury, the GAO, 
and OMB - to consider accounting principles and advocate standards advancing federal 
fmancial accountability and reporting. Further, on October 19, 1999, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) officially recognized the FASAB as 
the entity designated to formalize accounting principles for federal government 
departments and agencies. This is particularly significant to the federal reporting entities; 
as the FASAB's Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS) now 
stand as the government equivalent of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). Thus, all auditing entities must now verify that federal financial statements are 
in compliance with the accounting standards issued by the F ASAB as a prerequisite to 
any opinion on such financial statements as being in conformity with GAAP. [Ref. 2:p. 8] 
D. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993 
Congress enacted the GPRA (Public Law 1 03-62) in 1993 to augment the reform 
measures initiated by the CFO Act. The GPRA heralded the employment of performance 
measurement throughout the federal government, developed from the now-mandated 
consolidated and audited fmancial statements of the departments and agencies. The 
development and use of such performance measures for the federal government remained 
analogous to financial ratios employed in the private sector, where the resulting 
conclusions permit analysis of the entities' relative financial condition. [Ref. 3:p. 35] 
Beginning in FY 1999, the GPRA required evidence of the development of strategic 
planning in each federal department and agency in the form of annual performance plans 
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containing specific performance goals for that year. A subsequent requirement was the 
annual submission of a program performance report to Congress and the President, 
comparing results achieved with goals established in the annual performance plan, with 
the report covering FY 1999 due by March 31, 2000. By requiring the federal entities to 
measure and publicize outputs and outcomes against planning objectives, the GPRA 
ostensibly further increased accountability and effectiveness, and thus public confidence, 
in the departments and agencies. 
E. GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT REFORM ACT OF 1994 
The GMRA (Public Law 103-356) expanded the audit requirements of the CFO 
Act to include all 24 federal departments and agencies. It also accelerated the pace of 
federal fmancial reform by requiring preparation of the first true government-wide 
consolidated financial statement for FY 1997, as well as cutting the time for audit 
completion to within five months after the fiscal year to retain the relevance of the audit 
results. The expansion of the requirements for financial statement preparation and audit, 
the integration of accounting, budgetary, and program data, and employment of 
performance planning and reporting underscored the rising momentum in Congress to 
demonstrate fiscal efficiency and effectiveness in a climate of fiscal constraint. 
F. FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996 
The FFMIA (Public Law 1 04-208) built upon the CFO Act, the GPRA, and the 
GMRA, and established a formal congressional mandate to implement and maintain 
fmancial management systems that materially conform to federal financial management 
systems requirements, to include the employment of a singular, integrated financial 
management system. This legislation specifically called for the full disclosure of all 
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federal fmancial data through such a system, to include the full costs of federal programs 
and activities, and thus allowed for their consideration based upon merits and full 
implementation costs. It also required the head of each federal department or agency to 
report to Congress by March 31 of each year on the status of all systems not in 
compliance with this directive, as well as the recommended corrective actions and the 
time frames for their implementation that will bring compliance within three years. [Ref. 
4:pp. 400-403] 
The FFMIA additionally expanded the definition for fmancial statement 
compliance to include conformity with the Department of the Treasury's U.S. 
Government Standard General Ledger (SGL) at the transaction level. The Department of 
the Treasury holds responsibility for the consolidation and publication of the 
government-wide federal fmancial statement, and the SGL standardizes federal 
accounting through its integration of budgetary (appropriated funds) and proprietary 
(financial) accounting systems. [Ref. 5:pp. 48, 49] 
G. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1998 
The FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense to 
establish a Biennial Financial Management Improvement Plan (BFMIP), to be submitted 
to the Congress no later than September 30 of each even-numbered year. The 
Authorization Act called for this strategic plan to address all aspects of DoD financial 
management, to include finance systems, accounting systems, and most significantly, 
DoD data feeder systems that support finance and accounting system functions. It also 
required the inclusion of a concept of operations in the BFMIP, identifying DoD fmancial 
management operations and the manner in which they are executed~ Last, with regard to 
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data feeder systems, it mandated that the first submission of the plan present initiatives to 
consolidate and eliminate redundancy, to integrate with fmance and accounting systems, 
and to define the costs, benefits, problems, and feasibility of implementing these efforts. 
[Ref. 6:pp. 250, 251] For reference, Table 2.1 summarizes the Acts and events that form 
the collective legislative imperative for federal financial management reform, presenting 
a significant challenge to DoD in particular with focused requirements to achieve the 
high established federal standards. 
H. THE STATE OF DOD FISCAL REFORM 
1. Audit Status 
The five major legislative mandates and the Statements of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards issued by the F ASAB define the conditions the Department of 
Defense must meet, and thus the fiscal reform measures it must enact, to receive an 
unqualified audit opinion on its fmancial statements consolidated from those of the major 
DoD components. However, the GAO rendered a disclaimer of opinion on the FY 1997 
government-wide financial statements when it issued its first such audit opinion in March 
1998. With the disclaimer of opinion, the GAO cited material discrepancies considered 
"show-stopper" issues for five major categories, with property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E) predominating among them. It addition, it specified that the material financial 
management deficiencies identified within DoD " ... represent the single largest obstacle 
that must be effectively addressed to achieve an unqualified opinion on the U.S. 
government's consolidated fmancial statements." [Ref. l:p. I] FY 1998 government-
wide financial statements also received a disclaimer of opinion for these recurrent 
discrepancies, although GAO noted some incremental progress. 
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• Established financial management reform framework 
• Required integrated federal agency fmancial systems 
• Required publication of auditable financial reports, 
codification of internal controls for ten federal agencies 
• Instituted chief financial officers in federal agencies 
• 1990 - Established to consider accounting principles and 
advocate standards advancing federal financial accountability 
and reporting 
• 1999- Formally recognized as designated entity to establish 
official federal accounting and reporting standards 
• Verification of compliance with F ASAB accounting standards 
required as a prerequisite to any audit opinion on federal 
financial statements as being in conformity with GAAP 
• Heralded use of performance measurement in government 
• Beginning in FY 1999, required evidence of strategic 
planning - annual performance plans with specific goals 
• Required agencies to measure and publicize outputs and 
outcomes against planning objectives 
• Expanded CFO Act audit requirements to include all 24 
federal agencies 
• Required preparation of first government-wide consolidated 
fmancial statement by FY 1997 
• Decreased allowance time for federal fmancial statement audit 
completion to. five months after the fiscal year 
• Formal mandate for agencies to implement and maintain a 
singular, integrated financial management system 
• Required full disclosure of all financial data, including full 
costs of programs and activities 
• Required agency heads to report status of all noncompliant 
systems, as well as corrective actions and time frames, to 
Congress annually 
• Expanded definition for compliance to include conformity 
with SGL at transaction level 
• Required DoD to establish BFMIP submitted to Congress 
• BFMIP required to address all aspects of DoD financial 
management, to include nonfinancial feeder systems 
supporting finance and accounting system functions 
• Mandated nonfinancial feeder system section of BFMIP 
present initiatives to consolidate, to integrate with financial 
management systems, and to determine the feasibility of 
implementing such reforms 
Table 2-1. Summary of Federal Fmanc1al Management Legislative Acts and Events 
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The GAO rendered another disclaimer of opinion on the FY 1999 government-
wide financial statements, although 13 of the 24 federal departments and agencies 
received unqualified audit opinions. The Office of the Inspector General, Department of 
Defense, rendered a disclaimer of opinion on the DoD FY 1999 consolidated fmancial 
statements, and once again the pervasive deficiencies in DoD fmancial management 
systems, operations, and controls proved the greatest impediment to the federal 
government's compliance. The reasons behind this conclusion become apparent when 
considering the magnitude of DoD operations - approximately $1 trillion in assets, 
almost $1 trillion in liabilities reported, and a $378 billion net cost of operations as ofFY 
1999 - and their subsequent immense impact on consolidated government financial 
reports. 
Although neither DoD nor any of its major components yet holds any audit 
opinion on its fmancial statements outside a disclaimer of opinion, the Department, in 
truth, possesses substantial control of assets for which it is accountable and exacting 
records of the allocation oftaxpayer resources entrusted to it. In DoD's voluntary 1999 
update to the fust BFMIP, it reported its reliance upon 168 systems to execute fmancial 
management operations, including 70 nonfinancial feeder systems critical to asset 
accountability and fmancial reporting requirements. DoD attributes the propensity of 
problems in obtaining an audit opinion and achieving compliance with FFMIA federal 
financial management systems requirements to this multitude of archaic data feeder 
systems never intended to comply with subsequent accounting standards, and thus not 
designed to integrate with DoD's financial management systems. Although DoD 
fmancial management systems also remain noncompliant with current federal 
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requirements, the Department estimates that 80 percent of the relevant financial 
management data comes from these critical nonfinancial feeder systems. [Ref. 1 :pp. 44, 
45] 
2. Long-Term Reform Strategy 
The Department of Defense long-term strategy for financial management reform 
recognizes the requirement for a comprehensive restructuring of management 
information systems within DoD. Its central focus rests in the reengineering or 
replacement of noncompliant financial and nonfinancial systems to achieve 
implementation of new federal accounting standards and full interface with other DoD 
financial and nonfinancial systems that transmit and receive data among them. The 
upgrade and integration of the nonfinancial feeder systems to meet federal reporting 
requirements and interface with DoD financial systems presents a particularly formidable 
challenge for three principle reasons: 
1) The vast majority of such systems originate beyond the control of the 
financial management community. 
2) The primary original purpose of the nonfinancial systems is the support of 
specific categories or communities of U.S. military forces, not the 
production and transmission of fmancial data. 
3) The specialization of the majority of the nonfmancial feeder systems 
proves a substantial obstacle in terms of flexibility, preventing rapid 
responses to changes required by legislative mandates, management 
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initiatives, other government entities, operational contingencies, or the 
specific communities they serve. [Ref. 2:p. 9] 
September 30, 2003 serves as the current target date to complete the transformation and 
achieve compliance in all DoD financial, accounting, and feeder systems. 
The aforementioned BFMIP, first submitted to Congress in October 1998, 
represents the long-term architectural blueprint for DoD financial management reform, 
and comprehensively addresses accounting and finance issues. Voluntarily updated and 
submitted annually by DoD, the BFMIP addresses both financial systems and 
nonfinancial feeder systems, and establishes the DoD financial management concept of 
operations for the achievement of fiscal reform objectives. As a major development in 
the articulation of a long-term strategy, however, the BFMIP attempts to focus beyond 
compliance with federal reporting requirements to serve as a guide for the transition and 
evolution of DoD financial management systems, practices, and organizations. [Ref. 7: p. 
11] 
3. Short-Term Reform Strategy 
The Department of Defense short-term strategy for financial management reform 
recognizes the requirement for the development of interim methodologies to a level of 
compliance in major accounts sufficient to obtain a more favorable audit opinion on the 
DoD consolidated fmancial statements. To this end, DoD developed Implementation 
Strategies to serve as this interim solution until compliant financial management and 
feeder systems are operational. This involved the engagement of the GAO, the OMB and 
the DoD Office of the Inspector General in a collaborative effort to identify major 
obstacles to DoD success and develop alternative techniques to deal with them. Short-
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term strategies now exist to implement these alternative methodologies, which span the 
spectrum of fmancial and nonfinancial deficiencies, with milestone dates and 
organizations specified as accountable for executing the plans. 
Major PP&E valuation reforms figure prominently among extant short-term 
strategies, and serve as relevant examples in this thesis, to be examined at length in the 
following chapter. Briefly, current federal accounting standards reqUire PP&E reporting 
to employ acquisition, or historical costs, and subsequent depreciation. Auditors, in turn, 
require receipt or purchase documentation to verify these costs, but past federal record 
retention policies preclude satisfying stringent audit requirements. To alleviate such 
audit deficiencies, DoD contracted two prestigious private sector accounting firms to 
assess the value of DoD property in a manner acceptable to auditors. Also, DoD engaged 
both the accounting firms and the audit community to develop policy guidance and 
processes for the resolution of numerous and systemic accounting and feeder system 
deficiencies that currently preclude the capture, retention, and depreciation ofPP&E asset 
costs. [Ref. 8:pp. 12, 13] Additionally, DoD continues work with accounting firms and 
the audit community, specifically including the F ASAB accounting standard-setting 
entity, to develop further detailed policy guidance and defmitions ofPP&E that will assist 
major DoD components in identifying assets and reporting fmancial information not 
previously required and thus not yet provided. Within the DoD, the persistent lack of 
National Defense Asset PP&E accounting and reporting requirements remains the most 
significant and controversial example, and again a topic inherently relevant to this thesis, 
to be examined in several following chapters. 
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I. SUMMARY 
Congressional legislation enacted over the past decade established an 
unprecedented mandate for financial management reform throughout the federal 
government. The first major legislation, the CFO Act passed in 1990, set out a 
framework for general and financial management reform that required the establishment 
of integrated federal agency accounting and financial management systems, the 
publication of federal fmancial reports, and the institution of chief financial officer 
positions in the operating federal departments and agencies. Also in 1990, the 
government's financial principals formed the FASAB to consider and recommend 
accounting principles and standards for federal financial accountability and reporting, 
which as of 1999 gained sanction as the formally recognized GAAP-equivalent 
accounting principles for federal government departments and agencies. 
In 1993, the GPRA heralded the additional requirement for submission of annual 
performance plans and subsequent program performance reports to Congress and the 
President, comparing results achieved with goals established and thus measuring 
outcomes instead of inputs. The following year, the GMRA expanded the audit 
requirements of the CFO Act to include all 24 federal agencies, and accelerated the pace 
of federal financial reform by requiring preparation of the first true government-wide 
consolidated fmancial statement for FY 1997. The FFMIA built upon the CFO Act, the 
GPRA, and the GMRA in 1996, establishing a mandate for the full disclosure of all 
federal financial data through integrated financial management systems that materially 
conform to federal fmancial management systems requirements. It also required the head 
of each federal agency to report on the status of all noncompliant systems, as well as the 
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recommended corrective actions and the time frames for their implementation. Finally, 
the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act called for DoD to submit a BFWP addressing all 
aspects of DoD financial management, with the significant inclusion of DoD data feeder 
systems that support finance and accounting system functions. 
Collectively, the major legislation and its consequent stringent accounting 
standards and reporting requirements present a formidable challenge to DoD in its 
endeavors to enact financial management reform. To a major extent, DoD now 
recognizes that a predominant obstacle to compliance resides in at least 70 nonfmancial 
feeder systems critical to asset accountability and financial reporting requirements that 
were neither intended to comply with then-nonexistent accounting standards nor to 
integrate with DoD fmancial management systems. The concept of operations articulated 
and updated in the BFMIP represents DoD's long-term strategy for fmancial management 
reform, addressing the full spectrum of accounting and finance issues, and focusing at 
present on the restructuring of fmancial and nonfmancial feeder systems, with a self-
imposed deadline of September 30, 2003 to complete the transformation and achieve 
compliance in all DoD fmancial, accounting, and feeder systems. The short-term 
Implementation Strategies, however, represent a response to the Administration's goal, 
stated by the President in May 1998, of obtaining an unqualified audit opinion on the 
government-wide financial statements for FY 1999. Short-term strategy, in essence, 
focuses upon the development of interim methodologies for achieving sufficient 
compliance to obtain a more favorable audit opinion on the DoD consolidated financial 
statements until sustainable systems are operational, but the effort does effectively 
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engage both private sector accounting firms and the government audit community in 
collaborative efforts. 
In consideration of the tremendous legislative and political pressures for fiscal 
reform, DoD has demonstrated significant progress on many fronts, coupled with and 
driven by legitimate commitment among the senior leadership in the fmancial 
management community from the DoD Comptroller to his major component 
counterparts. Pervasive, complex fmancial management problems remain, however, and 
DoD must maintain the reform momentum beyond the unqualified opinions as limited 
objectives of the Implementation Strategies if it is to institute systems and processes that 
provide compliant and consistent fmancial information for effective management. [Ref. 
1 :pp. 2, 3] The next chapter examines the major obstacle in nonfinancial feeder system 
compliance: PP&E accounting and reporting. 
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ill. DOD NONFINANCIAL FEEDER SYSTEMS AND PROPERTY, 
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT REPORTING 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Department of Defense first published formal, comprehensive 
acknowledgment of major DoD nonfmancial feeder system noncompliance issues in the 
FY 1998 Biennial Financial Management Improvement Plan. The subsequent FY 1999 
update focused on 70 such systems as critical to complying with federal financial 
management and reporting requirements. The management and reporting of DoD 
Property, Plant and Equipment constitutes the primary mission for perhaps the most 
critical nonfmancial feeder systems, which are charged with accountability of 
approximately $1 trillion in assets. In numerous situations during war and peace, this 
involves materiel for military commanders with vital requirements for asset awareness to 
effectively execute their missions, as well as the facilities that support them. 
PP&E accounting and reporting proves so difficult and problematic precisely 
because the original purpose of these systems centers on the support of mission 
requirements. Their primary functions are detrimental to new demands for the same 
systems to serve as integrated accounting subsidiary ledgers and to provide fmancial data 
to generate fmancial statements compliant with federal mandates. Reporting financial 
information from such systems is critical to supporting mission requirements, however, 
providing such data as the cost of assets consumed, lost, or destroyed in operational 
contingencies that can serve as a basis for future decisions ranging from asset 
replacement to determination of resources, both financial and otherwise, to commit in 
future contingencies. As this example renders apparent, PP&E nonfinancial feeder 
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system issues encompass not only fmancial reporting requirements, but also asset 
management, accountability, and control. 
A thorough examination of the DoD PP&E compliance status and strategy thus 
necessitates a comprehensive understanding of relevant nonfinancial feeder system 
functional concepts as well as PP&E definitions and current DoD compliance initiatives. 
This chapter scrutinizes the DoD compliance status of and strategies for PP&E 
nonfinancial feeder systems, the most critical system obstacles to short-term compliance 
with federal accounting and reporting standards, focusing on system functional concepts 
and PP&E definitions. It first introduces the three major asset categories of PP&E, in the 
context of Statements ofF ederal Financial Accounting Standards. 
B. DOD NONFINANCIAL FEEDER SYSTEMS 
Within the DoD, the term "nonfmancial feeder system" refers to program 
information systems, manual or automated, that provide (feed) data to systems of the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DF AS). In response to the CFO Act and the 
formation of the FASAB, DoD established the DFAS in 1991 to serve as the primary 
agency for executing DoD fmance, accounting, and financial reporting operations. The 
agency developed and implemented strategic initiatives to dramatically cut the number of 
DoD accounting and finance systems, while concurrently eliminating a number of 
operations centers for its disbursement and accounting functions. [Ref. 7:p. 4] While 
DFAS' reform strategies generated and will continue to generate significant dividends in 
efficiency and effectiveness, past initiatives did not address the issue of nonfmancial 
feeder systems as major obstacles to compliance with federal fmancial reporting 
requirements. 
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DF AS systems derive information from feeder systems for financial management 
and/or accounting purposes, obtaining vital data for the preparation of the consolidated 
DoD financial statements. Nonfinancial feeder systems primarily and originally served 
the requirements of major DoD components' operating forces and program managers, 
functioning outside the control of the fmancial management community. In recent years, 
however, these systems have become subject to the specific financial management and 
accounting requirements of the FFMIA of 1996 and the subsequent National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1998 due to the fact that the systems generate data that support DoD 
fmancial operations and thus the integrated fmancial management system objective. 
Since then, the federal auditors' disclaimers of opinion on the financial statements of all 
major DoD components in every requisite audit, due to feeder system deficiencies, 
demonstrate pervasive issues to address in current and future compliance initiatives. The 
major recurrent issues include the following: 
1. Lack of Interface with Transaction-Driven General Ledgers 
The lack of transaction-driven general ledger interface represents the most 
persistent deficiency named by the Department's fmancial auditors. Core financial 
systems controlled by the DF AS hold principal responsibility for implementing and 
maintaining SGL-conformant general ledgers. Accounts maintained in those core 
systems must record and reflect all DoD financial events and transactions. The DoD 
components' nonfinancial feeder systems first capture and record the great majority of 
such fmancial events and transactions, but the consequent financial effects are only 
recorded erratically in and reflected by the DF AS core financial systems. 
No legislative mandate exists for SGL-conformant general ledgers to be 
25 
implemented and maintained within the nonfinancial feeder systems. Rather, they 
require that the feeder systems interface with DF AS core fmancial systems in such a 
manner that all necessary data will be recorded by and updated within the core systems. 
This integration requirement also includes the implementation of internal controls that 
permit core system account balances to be reconcilable to and supported by financial-
related events and transactions captured and reported by the nonfmancial feeder systems. 
[Ref. 9:p. 49] DF AS supports the prioritized initiatives among the DoD components to 
develop the requisite feeder system interfaces. Their target date of September 30, 2003 
for operational, interfacing, and SGL-conformant migratory core financial systems 
coincides with the greater DoD goal of compliance in all fmancial, accounting, and 
feeder systems. [Ref. 7:pp. 4, 11] 
2. Summarized Transaction Data Deficiencies 
Federal legislation requires the DF AS standard general ledger accounts to reflect 
all financial-related events and transactions, but it is infeasible, for both technological and 
budgetary reasons, to maintain a continuous feeder system interface that transmits every 
individual transaction directly to a core financial system. The DF AS core systems under 
development instead accept summarized transactions data. This will require modifying 
the nonfmancial feeder systems to capture and maintain data by standard financial 
transactions, and then to regularly transmit the summarized results to the DF AS core 
system SGL accounts. [Ref. 9:p. 49] More significantly, however, this implies that the 
interfacing nonfmancial feeder systems, outside the control of the financial community, 
will become the official systems for all entry of transaction data and maintenance of 
subsidiary details that support core financial system balances. For PP&E, the mandate 
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for summarized transaction data requires the capture and maintenance of PP &E 
transactions in the nonfinancial feeder systems, which then summarize and transmit such 
data on a periodic basis to the core financial systems. Effectively, the PP &E feeder 
systems must serve as databases that reconcile and detail respective SGL accounts in 
DF AS core financial systems. 
3. Joint and Mixed Feeder Systems Deficiencies 
The DFAS and the major DoD service components jointly operate a significant 
number of the 70 feeder systems acknowledged as critical. Of the joint feeder systems, 
some contain, control, and report both financial and nonfinancial information, and thus 
are designated as mixed systems. While DF AS holds responsibility for implementing 
and maintaining compliance upgrades affecting the feeder systems' financiftl 
components, the relevant service component remains accountable for the state of 
compliance of nonfinancial functions. The DF AS intends to consolidate the financial 
functions of a number of these joint and mixed systems into its core financial systems. 
This will leave the existing feeder systems entirely the responsibility of the service 
comi>onents - but still subject to federal financial management requirements for interface 
and integration with the separated functions now outside the services' cognizance. [Ref. 
9:pp. 48, 49] 
4. Lack of Financial Expertise in Communities Controlling Feeder 
Systems 
This nonfinancial feeder system issue concerns the lack of financial management 
expertise and perspective within the operational and support communities that operate 
such systems. Financial management experts and specialists drafted the legislative 
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mandates for fiscal reform, established the applicable GAAP-equivalent accounting 
standards, and developed the long-term DoD strategies to achieve compliance articulated 
in the BFMIP, but the communities charged with interpreting requirements and concepts 
relevant to nonfinancial feeder systems do not possess the requisite financial management 
perspective or expertise necessary for implementation. [Ref. 9:p. 49] Thus, their ability 
and incentive to develop alternative systems, or to modify or consolidate extant systems 
to achieve compliance, remain limited and/or inadequate. Only within the past year, as 
the DoD formally recognized the magnitude of the nonfinancial feeder system problems 
and prioritized their correction, have compliance initiatives throughout DoD incorporated 
the expertise of DF AS, public accounting firms, and various government audit entities in 
conjunction with the oversight of DoD financial management senior leadership. 
C. DOD PROPERTY, PLANT & EQUIPMENT DEFINITIONS AND 
INITIATIVES 
The GAO estimates that approximately 80% of the information required for the 
preparation of the consolidated DoD financial statement originates in the Department's 
nonfmancial feeder systems, rendering the efforts to achieve compliance a priority that 
transcends the fmancial management community to encompass the DoD itself. Another 
GAO estimate holds the value of DoD PP&E as four times that possessed by the rest of 
the federal agencies - combined. [Ref. 7:pp. 3, 12] Thus DoD PP&E, valued at 
approximately $1 trillion dollars and dispersed across the world, reigns predominant 
among the "show-stopper" categories of material discrepancy issues cited by the GAO. 
This dispersion of PP&E, located on over 500 bases in 150 countries and territories 
throughout the world, reflects the magnitude, scope, and complexity of the DoD financial 
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management issues in PP&E accountability and reporting. Accomplishment of the DoD 
mission - to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and to provide for 
the common defense of the United States - is PP&E-intensive, involving diverse 
operations, contingencies, and supporting activities, each employing a vast multitude of 
assets which may be mobile, classified, and/or unique to the DoD. While the DoD 
possesses substantial accountability for such PP&E in terms of safeguarding and 
maintenance, numerous deficiencies and issues exist in fmancially accounting for the 
same PP&E in terms of documentation for acquisition costs, asset depreciation, and 
disposal dates, as well as internal controls. 
1. FASAB PP&E Definitions and Accounting Standards 
The F ASAB issued Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFFAS) No. 6, "Accounting for Property, Plant, and Equipment," in November 1995. 
SFFAS No.6 establishes standards for four categories ofPP&E: General PP&E, Federal 
Mission (later restricted to National Defense) PP&E, Heritage Assets, and Stewardship 
Land. [Ref. 10:p. 518] General PP&E consists of tangible assets, including land, that 
meets the following criteria: 
1) an estimated useful life of 2 years or more, 
2) not intended for sale in the ordinary course of operations, and 
3) acquired or constructed with the intention ofbeing used, or being available 
for use, by the entity. 
It also comprises assets acquired through capital leases, property owned by the reporting 
entity in the hands of others, and land rights. More relevant to the thesis, General PP&E 
further divides into two categories: 
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I) Real Property, including land, buildings and other structures, and 
2) Personal Property, including equipment, vehicles, computers, and 
software. 
SFF AS No. 6 requires General PP&E to be recorded at acquisition cost, to include 
costs incurred to bring assets into fully operational condition, and subsequently 
depreciated. When historical costs of existing assets cannot be determined, the standard 
calls for cost estimates based upon either the known historical cost of similar assets at 
acquisition or the current cost of similar assets discounted since the date of acquisition for 
inflationary effects. [Ref. 11 :par. 21, 23-76] 
SFF AS No. 6 collectively refers to National Defense PP&E, Heritage Assets, and 
Stewardship Land as Stewardship PP&E, although this term and its consequent reporting 
requirements in reference to National Defense PP&E has provoked serious controversy 
that remains unresolved. This controversy will be covered at length in following sections 
and chapters. Per the standard's definition, National Defense PP&E consists of weapons 
systems and weapons systems related items. Heritage Assets constitute a distinct 
category of PP&E due to unique status derived from one or more of the following 
characteristics: historical or natural significance; cultural, educational or artistic 
importance; or significant architectural characteristics. Stewardship Land, fmally, 
comprises all federal government land that was previously public domain or donated to 
the government, other than that now considered General PP&E. [Ref. 11 :par. 23-76] 
SFF AS No. 8, "Supplementary Stewardship Reporting," issued in June 1996, 
defines the reporting requirements for National Defense PP&E, Heritage Assets, and 
Stewardship Land. Further examination of the latter two categories falls outside the 
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scope of the thesis, but SFFAS No.8 requires National Defense PP&E to be reported-by 
major type at either the historical cost or the latest acquisition cost in a Supplementary 
Stewardship Report accompanying the consolidated fmancial statements. SFF AS No. 8 
also requires such National Defense PP&E acquisition costs to be treated as an expense, 
which thus precludes capitalization of costs and consequent reporting on the Balance 
Sheet. [Ref. 12:par. 23-76] Due to continued controversy over implementation of the 
FASAB's National Defense PP&E reporting requirements, however, DoD currently 
reports only quantities of National Defense assets in the Supplementary Stewardship 
Report. 
2. DoD Implementation Strategy Compliance Initiatives 
The DoD neither maintains accountability nor accounts for General PP&E with 
financial systems, but rather with nonfinancial feeder systems, such as property 
management and logistics systems. Such systems have effectively served thefr primary 
purpose, the support of specific operational mission requirements, but have been unable 
to satisfy the unforeseen legislative mandates for those same systems to record costs and 
dates of acquisition, improvement and disposition, or to calculate current year and accu-
mulated depreciation. Also, until recently the DoD has disposed of supporting 
documentation for the acquisition costs of PP&E after six years and three months in 
accordance with the National Archives and Records Administration maximum federal 
document retention requirements, but in violation of current audit requirements. This 
deficiency effectively prevents auditors from verifying acquisition costs and validating 
reported values. [Ref. 8:pp. 12, 13] 
With diverse nonfmancial feeder systems incapable of reporting fmancial 
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information as accounting subsidiary ledgers, and with essential acquisition 
documentation largely nonexistent, DoD required alternative methods to achieve 
compliance with federal fmancial management legislation. The DoD Implementation 
Strategies discussed in Chapter II specifically address such pervasive deficiencies and are 
designed to achieve interim solutions. The Implementation Strategies relevant to PP&E 
address the deficiencies identified by the auditors in past disclaimers of opinion. These 
compliance initiatives progress, with varied success, under the oversight and approval of 
DoD, OMB, and the government audit community. 
a. Real Property 
The federal audit community reviewed DoD Real Property databases as an 
element of this Implementation Strategy, and determined them reliable for both existence, 
with Real Property data maintained in the feeder systems traceable to extant physical 
assets, and completeness, with the proper extant physical assets recorded in the Real 
Property feeder systems. KPMG Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse Coopers, certified 
public accounting (CPA) firms hired by the Department, assisted in the initiatives to 
evaluate current capitalization thresholds and accurately report Real Property values by 
reviewing, testing, and analyzing the relevant database information. In separate 
conclusions, the CPA firms recommended that: 
1) DoD retain the current $100,000 capitalization threshold and depreciation 
recovery periods, but disconnect them from the Congress' investment and 
expense funding threshold utilized in annual appropriation acts, and 
2) DoD accept the existing recorded costs and subsequently report them on 
the major components' financial statements. 
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On both counts, the Department accepted the CPA firms' recommendations, and issued 
implementation policy. [Ref. 13:pp. 44, 45] 
Other concerns raised by the government auditors and the CPA firms, 
however, remain unresolved with the requirement for auditable fmancial statements in 
conformance with federal fmancial management accounting standards. Every Military 
Department possesses material deficiencies in Real Property accounting processes, 
procedures, and internal controls that require prioritization and correction. DoD 
compliance initiatives to address these weaknesses center on the timely and accurate 
capture and maintenance of acquisition data in the feeder systems, as well as the retention 
of required supporting documentation. Further, the DoD issued a formal Directive, 
DoDD 5000.nn, and a corresponding manual, "Property, Plant and Equipment 
Accountability," which articulates DoD policy and establishes specific responsibilities for 
PP&E accountability. The Directive's implementation also institutes other requirements 
for feeder system employment in the recording of PP&E acquisition, use, and disposal 
data, and the maintenance of mandatory minimum internal controls and supporting 
documentation. [Ref. 13:pp. 44, 45] 
b. Personal Property 
For this Implementation Strategy the DOD also contracted with the CPA 
firms, to conduct existence, completeness and valuation tests on the multitude of General 
PP&E Personal Property databases, in addition to an evaluation of Personal Property 
capitalization thresholds and depreciation recovery periods. However, the lack of CFO 
Act-compliant Personal Property feeder systems represented a major impediment to 
obtaining legitimate existence, completeness, and valuation results. DoD responded to 
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this fundamental deficiency with an initiative focused on the modification, upgrade, and 
deployment of the Defense Property Accounting System (DP AS) to achieve compliance 
with federal fmancial management system requirements. With the exception of certain 
Defense Agencies and the Air Force, all DoD components will employ DPAS as the sole 
Personal Property nonfinancial feeder system, with the capability to capture and maintain 
acquisition cost data and calculate depreciation. [Ref. 13 :p. 45] 
Although capitalization thresholds remained unchanged, major internal 
control and procedural deficiencies identified within the Military Departments also 
required resolution prior to testing for existence, completeness, and valuation. KPMG 
and Price Waterhouse Coopers concluded that correction called for modification of the 
Implementation Strategy approach itself, omitting valuation tests for immaterial Personal 
Property values on the financial statements, and instead concentrating finite resources on 
the pervasive weaknesses identified in the Personal Property feeder systems. DoD 
launched compliance initiatives to ensure the capitalization at acquisition cost of new 
Personal Property, and the retention of supporting documentation in accordance with 
revised financial management regulations. Corrections to internal control, process, and 
procedural deficiencies centered on the recording of additions, deletions, and 
modifications for Personal Property information in the requisite feeder systems. [Ref. 
13:p. 45] DoD policy disseminated by DoDD 5000.nn establishes further specific 
requirements for Personal Property feeder system functionality. 
c. National Defense Assets 
Development of Implementation Strategy National Defense Asset 
initiatives to achieve compliance with federal financial management legislation remain 
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limited by a lack of consensus within the F ASAB standard-establishing entity on 
National Defense PP&E accounting and reporting requirements. The original relevant 
SFF ASs, No. 6 and No. 8, required the reporting of National Defense PP&E at either 
historical "total cost" or "latest acquisition cost." The latest acquisition cost valuation 
method, although never implemented for National Defense Assets, attempted to 
recognize the difficulties inherent in ascertaining the actual acquisition costs of individual 
assets acquired long ago by permitting the valuation of the full inventory of a specific 
weapon system at the acquisition cost of the last one. The F ASAB attempted to alter the 
two standards in February 1998, issuing a 72-paragraph draft, "Amendments to 
Accounting for Property, Plant, and Equipment." Among the relatively minor proposals 
was the following change: 
National Defense PP&E shall be reported in quantities by major types .... 
Reporting should also include data in nominal dollars on acquisition costs 
incurred for National Defense PP&E for the year being reported upon and 
the preceding four years. [Ref. 14:p. 37] 
This proposal requires DoD to only report numbers of weapon systems and annual 
expenditures on new weapon systems. While such an alteration to the standards results in 
immediate "compliance," it eliminates any requirement to track or report the cost of the 
greater part of $1 trillion in particular assets, undermining initiatives to establish cost 
accounting systems and controls and violating the intent of federal financial management 
legislation. 
The F ASAB attempted to incorporate this material change to National 
Defense valuation, despite overwhelming external opposition, but Congress coerced the 
FASAB to withdraw its proposal. In October 1999, with the FASAB still incapable of 
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consensus on National Defense Asset accounting and reporting, the board committed to 
considering the conclusions and recommendations of an independent, contractual 
examination of alternative National Defense PP&E accounting and reporting methods, 
funded by the DoD. KPMG Peat Marwick, selected in January 2000, will submit a report 
exploring multiple alternatives to National Defense Asset accounting and reporting 
requirements, to include estimated costs and time frames for implementation. The scope 
of the study spans the DoD, and thus also mandates independent review and evaluation of 
the diverse acquisition methodologies extant among the Military Departments and 
Defense Agencies. [Ref. 13:p. 46] This initiative to define National Defense Asset 
accounting and reporting requirements, which of necessity must precede any 
Implementation Strategy to achieve compliance with any such requirements, possessed 
an original target completion date of September 30, 2000, but thus far remains 
unfinished. 
D. SUMMARY 
Department of Defense Property, Plant, and Equipment nonfinancial feeder 
systems account for approximately $1 trillion in assets, and the major impact of the data 
they capture and maintain on consolidated financial statements renders them critical to 
compliance with federal financial management and reporting requirements. These 
systems' original missions centered on the support of specific operational requirements. 
Compliant PP&E accounting and reporting proves so challenging because recent 
mandates have required the same systems to additionally serve as integrated accounting 
subsidiary ledgers and to provide vital financial data for DF AS core financial systems 
which are used for the preparation of the consolidated DoD financial statements. Federal 
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auditors' disclaimers of opinion on the financial statements arise in great part due· to 
feeder system deficiencies, most prominently: 
I) the lack of feeder system interface with DF AS transaction-driven general 
ledgers, 
2) the erratic transmission, or absence, of summarized transactions data from 
feeder systems to DF AS core system SGL accounts, 
3) the difficulties in separating and migrating joint and mixed systems where 
multiple entities hold responsibility for implementing federal fmancial 
management requirements for interface and integration, and 
4) the lack of financial management expertise and perspective within the 
communities operating feeder systems. 
Within the DoD, the dispersion, volume, and diversity of PP&E exacerbate 
difficulties in resolving fmancial management issues in PP&E accountability and 
reporting. F ASAB-issued accounting standards, SFF ASs No. 6 and No. 8, collectively 
define the relevant PP&E categories of Real Property, Personal Property, and National 
Defense Assets. With the prominent exception of National Defense PP&E, they 
adequately articulate accounting and reporting requirements. Due to numerous 
nonfmancial feeder systems incapable of reporting fmancial information as accounting 
subsidiary ledgers and largely nonexistent essential acquisition documentation, DoD has 
had to develop Implementation Strategies to address the deficiencies and achieve 
compliance with federal financial management legislation. 
Auditors determined DoD Real Property databases to be reliable for both 
existence and completeness, and CPA firms concluded DoD should retain the current 
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$100,000 capitalization threshold and accept the current recorded costs as materially 
accurate. Personal Property, however, required the deployment of the Defense Property 
Accounting System (DP AS) to achieve compliance with federal fmancial management 
system requirements, as well as modification of the original Implementation Strategy 
approach. Both Real and Personal Property initiatives focused on internal control, 
process, and procedural deficiencies, and DoDD 5000.nn established formal policy and 
further requirements for feeder system employment. 
National Defense Asset requirements for accountability and reporting remain 
unresolved, but an outcome to the controversial issue will lead to subsequent DoD 
initiatives to achieve feeder system compliance. After completion of the independent 
examination of the alternative approaches to accounting for and reporting National 
Defense PP&E, bureaucratic and political imperatives and proprieties will inevitably 
delay release and external scrutiny, for an indeterminate length of time, until senior 
leadership finds appropriate opportunity for consideration of conclusions and 
recommendations. The Implementation Strategies and the potential National Defense 
alternatives considered by the contractual examination therefore warrant timely, objective 
scrutiny, to be accomplished in the scope of this thesis by narrowing focus on a Military 
Department's execution of reform strategy. For the following chapter, this thesis centers 
on the specific initiatives and current progress in Department of the Navy PP&E 
nonfinancial feeder system compliance, in the context of DoD Implementation Strategies 
for Real Property, Personal Property, and National Defense. 
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IV. CURRENT DON PROGRESS IN PP&E NONFINANCIAL 
FEEDER SYSTEM COMPLIANCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Examination of DoN initiatives and current progress in PP&E nonfinancial feeder 
system compliance requires the context of legislative requirements and DoD compliance 
strategies respectively established in Chapters II and III. This chapter endeavors to 
separately evaluate the progress achieved thus far under each of the PP&E nonfinancial 
feeder system initiatives, in the context of both the differing system deficiencies in the 
asset categories and the Navy's organizational strategy for confronting them. The 
progress of the DoN in executing these fmancial management reforms reflects not only 
the DoD Implementation Strategies and the status of subsequent initiatives, but also 
specific Navy priorities and organizational structures. FY 2000 marks the fifth DoN 
Annual Financial Statement submitted under the CFO Act requirements, and while 
auditors continued to issue disclaimers of opinion as of FY 1999, they have noted 
measurable progress with each successive report. PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems 
remain the most critical obstacles to continued progress and eventual compliance with 
federal financial management reform requirements. 
Charles P. Nemfakos, Senior Civilian Official for the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller), recognized in the FY 
1999 DoN Annual Financial Report the critical need for addressing these issues as 
identified in the Biennial Financial Management Improvement Plan and the 
Implementation Strategies. He states in his official introductory message: 
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The DoN is creating an environment where new structures, processes, and 
systems can be developed that will enable the enterprise to operate 
effectively in the rapidly changing global environment. The old map of 
business stovepipes and business-as-usual no longer accurately reflects 
contemporary thinking. Rather than turning inwardly for the answers to 
the enterprise challenge, senior leadership is being encouraged to think 
cross-functionally and look to the outside environment for creative 
solutions and best practices. [Ref. 15] 
This strategic imperative at the Navy level to consider cross-functional and private sector 
solutions to achieve compliance with federal reporting requirements resulted in the 
establishment of focused working groups to separately confront the challenges. The 
disparate status of the respective systems addressed by each working group resulted in 
diverse levels of resources dedicated to effect resolution, as well as different approaches 
to address the magnitude of the deficiencies. Regardless, the Navy's specific 
organizational strategy demonstrates an institutional commitment to the achievement of a 
functional fmancial management system, and their current progress in nonfinancial feeder 
system compliance reflects the DoN momentum for fiscal reform. 
B. DON FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES 
DoN established 13 Nonfinancial Feeder System Working Groups in response to 
the two DoD compliance approaches published in 1998: the Biennial Financial 
Management Improvement Plan, defining the future DoD financial management 
environment with a concept of operations for achieving it, and the Implementation 
Strategies, supporting the Administration's public goal of an auditable consolidated 
federal fmancial statement with requirements for submitting corrective action plans. The 
sustained efforts of the Working Groups fell under the cognizance of the Deputy 
Undersecretary of the Navy, receiving prioritization in resources to an extent 
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unprecedented in DoN financial management history. In turn, the Navy holds each team 
responsible for " ... assessing, developing alternatives, and implementing the solution that 
will lead to better business processes, full accountability of our assets and ultimately, 
auditable financial statements." [Ref. 16:p. 28] 
DoN organized Working Groups to address each of the DoD Implementation 
Strategies relevant to the Navy. A flag officer or senior DoN civilian heads each 
Working Group, which consists of program and financial management functional area 
experts from the Secretariat, Navy and Marine Corps Headquarters, Defense Agencies, 
private sector contractors, and the audit community (GAO, DoD Inspector General, and 
Naval Audit Service). The invaluable presence of the audit community representatives, a 
unique aspect of the Navy's organizational structure and strategy, allows the validation of 
alternative resolution measures from their perspective as the teams consider them. [Ref. 
17:p. 26] DoN Working Groups relevant to the focus of this thesis include the Real 
Property, Personal Property, and National Defense Asset teams. 
The team initiatives initially progressed slowly, attributable to the diverse 
backgrounds and perspectives of the assembled functional area experts. During FY 1999, 
the Working Groups assessed the requirements for the implementation of alternative 
business practices and the elimination of redundant and manually intensive systems. This 
examination prioritized the achievement of the Administration's goal of auditable 
financial statements, but also considered the modifications essential for remaining 
migratory systems to comply with federal accounting standards and system reporting 
requirements. All three PP&E Working Groups registered progress, but the current status 
of their respective compliance initiatives varies significantly, due to dramatically 
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different levels of deficiencies extant within each asset category and the corresponding 
complexity of the corrective strategy. 
C. REAL PROPERTY 
1. Situation 
The Navy employs one standard nonfmancial feeder system for Real Property 
accountability and financial reporting purposes, the Naval Facilities Asset Database 
(NF ADB), which serves as the DoN' s central repository for building and land asset 
inventories. This extant standard system renders Real Property the least complex of the 
three categories in terms of achieving compliance with federal accounting standards and 
reporting requirements. In its primary mission supporting the engineering and public 
works communities, the NF ADB database also serves in the efficient planning and 
management of shore facilities, funding for building new and removing excess facilities, 
Real Property maintenance, and base realignment. [Ref. 18:p. 1-4] 
Currently, NFADB maintains an automated data file on every existing facility, to 
include land, buildings, structures, and utilities owned or leased by DoN. The system 
contains records on over 176,000 individual Real Property assets, classified and defined 
by location, acquisition date and cost, construction, size, capacity, utilization, and 
condition data fields. Formerly, access to update and query the master NF ADB database, 
located at the Facilities Systems Office (F ACSO) in Port Hueneme, California, only 
existed at the five Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs) and the FACSO itself. Only 
remote job entry terminals located at the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Headquarters and the five EFDs could request and retrieve NF ADB reports, which 
contained the critical data call responses. [Ref. 18:pp. 1-2, 1-3] 
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For FY 1999 financial statement reporting, DoN still obtained Real Property data 
from NF ADB via the archaic data call. Compliance with federal financial reporting 
requirements calls for nothing less than full interface with DoN/DF AS core financial 
systems as an integrated component. Table 4-1 [After Ref. 16:pp. 63, 64] illustrates the 
net ending Real Property PP&E balance as calculated for FY 1999 as a component of 
General PP&E. 
2. Progress 
Initiatives in FY 1999 focused primarily upon the accuracy of nonfmancial feeder 
system data, in terms of existence, completeness, and valuation, and the consideration of 
alternatives to achieve system compliance with federal accounting standards. DoN Civil 
Engineers and Public Works personnel physically inspected and measured buildings and 
land assets, and conducted an extensive search for requisite property records, some of 
which pre-date the Civil War. The private sector CPA firm Price Waterhouse Coopers 
statistically sampled different properties to obtain a reasonable estimate of value for 
fmancial reporting purposes. Government and private sector auditors followed with 
facility visits to validate the surveys, again measuring and examining required 
documentation. [Ref. 17:pp. 26, 27] These initiatives proved successful, resulting in a 
determination of reliability from the auditors for the NF ADB in terms of existence, 
completeness, and material accuracy of current recorded costs. GAO and the DoD 
Inspector General do not yet concur with this conclusion, however, leaving the next 
course of action in question. 
The team also identified the NF ADB modifications required to calculate 
depreciation and establish internal controls necessary for the long-term sustainment of 
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Table 4-1. DoN General PP&E 
Real Property. These amounts do not reflect DoN implementation of the Preponderant 
Use Policy as set forth by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in 1999. The 
policy requires DoN to report predominantly used assets owned by other DoD 
components only when the cost of those assets, taken as a whole, are material to DoN's 
fmancial statements. The NF ADB is under evaluation to determine recurring 
requirements for preponderant use assignment and functionality. These amounts do 
include Real Property in the possession of contractors. 
Leasehold Improvements. DoN reported no separate leasehold improvements for FY 
1999, instead including them in the buildings, structures, and facilities category. The 
requirement to separately identify this asset category came after dissemination of the data 
call. DoN intends to rectify this deficiency for FY 2000 fmancial statements. 
Personal Property. These amounts do not reflect DoN Personal Property in the 
possession of contractors. Although consideration of assets in the possession of 
contractors falls outside the scope of this thesis, DoN is evaluating processes to collect 
this information. 
Equipment. Of the $9,126,054 total acquisition value, inadequate information precluded 
the calculation of depreciation, and thus the reporting of depreciation expense and 
accumulated depreciation on $6,689,525 of the total. Where sufficient information 
existed to facilitate depreciation computation, it accounts for no residual value. 
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accurate financial reporting, and implemented the modifications in FY 2000, with 
validation testing currently underway. NF ADB programmers eliminated many of the 
external controls and processing requirements that prohibited system interfaces, but Navy 
reporting activities granted updating access to NF ADB must still work through and 
obtain F ACSO passwords from the EFDs, who determine the functionality each activity 
will possess as an Expanded Access Site. Future web-based interface will allow read-
only access, however. A separate FY 2000 Real Property initiative in conjunction with 
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DF AS) concerned the development of an 
electronic interface with the Navy's Standard Accounting and Reporting System 
(STARS), with completion and testing currently expected in the March 2001 timeframe. 
Figure 4-1 illustrates the NF ADB reporting processes as they ostensibly function with the 
current level of DoN progress in addressing the nonfinancial feeder system's deficiencies 
and achieving Real Property financial reporting compliance. 
D. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. Situation 
The Personal Property category presents substantially greater complexity in 
addressing deficiencies, because the vital financial reporting data resides in a multitude of 
disparate, noncompliant nonfmancial feeder systems from which DF AS Operations 
Locations (OPLOCs) manually collect questionable data. DoN, as a result, elected to 
commit resources to the DoD initiative to modify, upgrade, and deploy the Defense 
Property Accounting System (DP AS) to achieve compliance with federal fmancial 
management system requirements, instead of attempting to modify hundreds of stovepipe 
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DP AS utilizes an on-line, multifunctional, and interactive systems environment to 
address property accountability, property valuation, equipment utilization, and preventive 
maintenance scheduling. Beyond its interface with DoN and DF AS automated fmancial 
systems, DP AS possesses the capability to capture and maintain acquisition cost data and 
calculate depreciation, to support all property and equipment management and 
accountability requirements [Ref. 19], and thus to eventually function as the sole Personal 
Property nonfinancial feeder system. However, its implementation represents a systemic 
change in DoN business culture and processes. Table 4-1 also illustrates the net ending 
Personal Property PP&E balance as calculated for FY 1999 as a component of General 
PP&E. 
2. Progress 
The DoD DP AS initiative focused on capital assets, those with an acquisition 
value of at least $100,000. DoN, however, pursued DPAS implementation as a chance to 
fundamentally revolutionize Personal Property accountability and financial reporting, and 
exponentially increased the number of assets to be accounted for with the system by 
incorporating the minimum Personal Property accountability threshold of $2,500. DoD 
granted its full support to the more ambitious DoN initiative in FY 1999, and in an 
unprecedented action the audit community followed suit. [Ref. 17:p. 27] DoN 
contracted with KPMG Peat Marwick to conduct an independent assessment of Personal 
Property data accuracy to determine reliability for existence and completeness, as with 
Real Property in the NFADB. The firm's study remains incomplete, complicated 
exponentially in comparison to the Real Property assessment due to the multitude of 
different nonfmancial feeder systems and the data transfer with DP AS implementation. 
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However, since the DP AS compliance initiative now requires complete physical 
inventories before data transition can occur, existence and completeness of data will be 
largely ensured upon implementation of the nonfmancial feeder system. 
In FY 1999, the Marine Corps deployed DPAS in approximately nine months, 
although some activities later revised physical inventories and reviewed the accuracy of 
their databases in FY 2000, due to the lack of catalogs and standard operating procedures 
at implementation. The Navy will deploy DP AS at more than 900 activities, with priority 
thus far given to those activities accounting for the majority of capitalized assets with an 
acquisition cost of $100,000 or more. As of December 2000, approximately 200 DoN 
activities employ DPAS, including 33 Marine Corps sites. DPAS will eventually 
maintain all DoN equipment property records, although the data conversion process to 
inventory and reconcile each activity's Personal Property records, and to obtain accurate 
historical cost data, will not conclude until FY 2003, by latest projections. [Ref. 16:p. 63] 
The ambition and scope ofthe DoN DPAS implementation initiative called for the 
support of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the DF AS, the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), the government audit community, and the CPA finn KPMG 
Peat Marwick. Deployment of a nonfmancial feeder system entirely new to the Navy 
consequently required the development of alternative Personal Property policies, 
operating procedures, and internal controls. Official release of the resulting DoN DP AS 
Users' Guide is imminent, expected by January 2001. Collateral projects continued in 
FY 2000 for the establishment of a comprehensive Personal Property catalog, a standard 
barcode system, and extensive, sustainable personnel training curriculums and computer-
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assisted tutorials. [Ref. 16: pp. 29,30] Currently, Personal Property catalogs for the Navy 
and Marine Corps are operational, but remain works-in-progress. 
Achieving progress in Personal Property compliance initiatives, as previously 
mentioned, presented a higher level of complexity than that experienced in Real Property 
reforms. The implementation of DP AS eliminated the difficulties inherent in addressing 
the deficiencies of over a hundred stovepipe nonfinancial feeder systems, but the process 
of the DP AS transition itself has proven a substantial, complex obstacle to compliance. 
A diverse array of challenges confronted the implementation process, with institutional 
resistance to change figuring prominently among the difficulties. Unlike the Real 
Property initiative, where operational communities required only the modification of an 
extant, compliant system, the Personal Property initiative necessitated a fundamental 
paradigm and technology shift at every activity maintaining a Personal Property database. 
High operating tempos and personnel shortfalls also presented a tangible problem, with 
activities unable or unwilling to commit personnel to the accurate physical inventory of 
vast quantities of Personal Property assets essential for the transition of data into DP AS. 
Technological issues comprised a further material impediment, due primarily to DPAS 
interface requirements using the activities' extant computer networks. With the multitude 
of unique network "firewalls" employed throughout the DoN, and the variable 
competence and cooperativeness of their attendant network security personnel, 
implementation of DP AS' networking capabilities represented a pervasive, recurrent 
obstacle. Despite these and other less prevalent difficulties, DP AS implementation 
continues and the Personal Property initiatives proceed with measurable progress. Figure 
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4-2 [After Ref. 20:p. 12] illustrates the fundamental differences in reporting processes 
between the partially realized DPAS implementation model and the still-functioning 
DF AS "OPLOC Model," where DF AS OPLOCs manually collect critical financial 




The National Defense Asset category presents the greatest complexity and 
challenge to the achievement of compliance with federal accounting standards and 
reporting requirements. The F ASAB established no government GAAP-equivalent 
standard for defining, accounting for, or reporting National Defense PP&E after their 
abortive attempt in 1998, leaving the DoN without conclusive guidance. Further, at the 
initiative's outset, the Navy possessed no evaluation of the compliance status of the 
multiple extant National Defense nonfinancial feeder systems in operation, as did the 
Real Property team with NF ADB, nor a single new integrated system to implement as a 
replacement for the current noncompliant databases, as did the Personal Property team 
withDPAS. 
In the absence of other enforced standards from the F ASAB and at the standard-
setting body's encouragement, DoD preempted the adoption of the FY 1998 proposed 
amendments to Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFF ASs) Nos. 6 
and 8, as discussed in Chapter III, by implementing the proposal's permissive National 
Defense reporting requirements. The F ASAB did not adopt the amendments, but the 
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quantities, operational levels, and current investments in FY s 1998 and 1999. 
Government auditors consider DoN noncompliant due to the existing requirement in 
SFFAS No. 8 for reporting acquisition costs, but current DoN National Defense PP&E 
nonfmancial feeder systems neither capture nor accumulate such costs, nor otherwise 
report values for specific National Defense assets. [Ref. 16:pp. 32, 92] Even where 
systems contain acquisition costs, the vast majority of supporting documentation required 
to validate reported values does not exist due to the lack of any mandate, until recently, to 
retain such receipts beyond six years and three months. 
The Navy continues to report National Defense PP&E in accordance with the 
defunct requirements of the FASAB's proposal rejected in 1998, but not without some 
justification. The cost of complying with extant requirements in SFF AS No. 8 remains 
materially prohibitive in funding and human resources, when the existing standard is not 
enforced and the F ASAB expects to establish different permanent reporting requirements. 
In their critical absence, DoN considers the current reporting method an interim measure, 
which nonetheless demonstrates that the Navy possesses substantial accountability, if not 
. fmancial accounting, for National Defense PP&E. Tables 4-2 [After Ref. 2l:Exhibit A, p. 
1] and 4-3 [After Ref. 21:Exhibit B, p. 1,2] illustrate the full extent of DoN financial 
statement reporting of National Defense PP&E as a component of FY 1999 Required 
Supplementary Stewardship Information. 
Even under these comparatively permissive reporting standards, however, the 
blatant deficiencies and consequent imperatives for compliance with federal fmancial. 
management requirements for system interface and integration remain readily apparent. 
DoN National Defense PP &E quantities reported for FY 1999, as shown in Table 4-2, are 
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epartment of the Navy National Defense PP&E 
uantities for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 September 1999 (Stated in Numbers of Systems/Items) 
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tDepartment of the Navy National Defense PP&E 
~early Investments for FY 1998 and FY 1999 (In Millions of Dollars) 
!NATIONAL DEFENSE PP&E FY 1998 FY 1999 
!Aircraft 
Combat $2,698 $2,897 
Airlift c 34 
Other 356 2,004 
Aircraft Support Principal End Items 2,98I 722 
Other Aircraft Support PP&E 0 974 
Ish ips 
Submarines I,089 1,409 
Aircraft Carriers 1,301 823 
Surface Combatants 2,879 3,552 
Amphibious Warfare Ships 753 581 
Mine Warfare Ships 89 73 
Support Ships 0 359 
Other Ships 575 30 
Ship Support Principal End Items 851 852 
Other Ship Support PP&E 0 I 
!Combat Vehicles 
Tracked 74 64 
Wheeled ( 106 
Towed ( c 
Other 0 0 
Combat Vehicles Support Principal End Items 0 I2 
Other Combat Vehicles Support PP&E 0 I 
!Guided, Self-Propelled Ordnance 
Missiles 1,351 349 
Torpedoes I25 7C 
Ordnance Support Principal End Items 4I4 H 
Other Ordnance Support PP&E 0 I98 
!space Systems 
Satellites 0 0 
Space Systems Support Principal End Items 130 115 
Other Space Systems Support PP&E 0 0 
!other 
Other Weapons Systems 48 43 
Other Weapons Systems Support Principal End Items I06 0 
Other Weapons Systems Support PP&E 0 42 
!Weapon Systems Support 
Active Ammunition Bunkers 28 19 
Active Missile Silos 0 {] 
Active Satellite Ground Stations 0 {] 
!General Mission Support PP&E I,792 1,897 
Table 4-3. DoN NatiOnal Defense PP&E Yearly Investments 
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incomplete because of the specific exclusion of two major categories ofNational Defense 
Assets - Support Principal End Items, such as aircraft engines and radars, and Mission 
Support Equipment, such as nontactical vehicles and cryptographic systems. Thus, 
hundreds of different types of support equipment costing billions of dollars were not 
reported anywhere in DoN fmancial statements. Unreported Navy aircraft engines alone 
account for $7.6 billion of missing assets. [Ref. 1:p. 19] Of the over 9,600 missing 
aircraft engines, the Navy listed 658 at the time, costing $415 million, as in transit- for 
between 90 days and 18 years. DoN also incorrectly included 661 inactive ships, which 
skewed Condition Operational percentages and raised serious reliability and readiness 
concerns. [Ref. 21 :pp. 21, 35, 36] 
Some National Defense asset quantities do not appear on any centralized asset 
visibility system records, potentially precluding reporting on their existence. DoN 
obtained ballistic missile data for FY 1999 reports from personnel maintaining local 
spreadsheets at two facilities. Manual collection procedures, or data calls, are less 
reliable and dependent on timely, accurate human response. Further, their necessity 
prevents visibility over all DoN National Defense PP&E and related information vital to 
effectively managing operations. [Ref. 1 :p. 20] 
The National Defense PP&E yearly investment data shown in Table 4-3 also 
contained material inaccuracies, demonstrating pervasive internal control weaknesses. 
For one-year periods, FYs 1998 and 1999, the Navy understated outlays by $82 million 
and $783 million respectively. All errors occurred because of data misclassification, 
duplication, erroneous alteration, or exclusion. Also, although having justified to an 
extent the Navy's continued use of this defunct reporting standard, it discloses only $17 
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billion of an estimated $310 billion in National Defense PP&E held by the DoN. The 
absence of these critically material costs jeopardizes the legitimacy of DoN financial 
reporting in its entirety, and the sooner serious initiatives to capture such costs are 
realized, the sooner the Navy will benefit from enhanced decision making capabilities 
and demonstrated financial accountability and integrity. [Ref. 21:pp. 59, 66] 
2. Progress 
The National Defense PP&E team began with the identification of 17 critical 
nonfinancial feeder systems for assessment that accounted for National Defense assets. 
The Navy contracted again with the CPA firm KPMG, this time to evaluate National 
Defense PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems, methods, processes, and procedures. 
Current team initiatives entail the assessment of each system to evaluate the accuracy of 
extant data in terms of existence, completeness, and valuation, where possible, as well as 
levels of compliance with federal financial management legislative requirements and 
consequent laws and regulations. [Ref. 17:p. 27] Table 4-4 [After Ref. 22:p. 20] lists 
these 17 critical National Defense systems, although discussion of their specific functions 
and levels of compliance lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Concurrently, the Working Group and KPMG are also considering alternatives to 
the current labor-intensive processes inherent to the National Defense accounting and 
reporting systems structure, an architecture which must change in some form as a 
prerequisite to compliance with legislated system interface and integration requirements. 
Extensive deliberations and consultations resulted in the establishment of four 
conceivably viable alternative approaches to accounting for and reporting National 
Defense PP&E: 
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ational Defense PP&E Nonfinancial Feeder Systems 
ATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM 
·rcraft Inventory Readiness & Reporting System 
aximo Database 
"rcraft Engine Maintenance System 
ommercial Engine Tracking 
upport Equipment Resources Mgmt. Information System 
ocal Asset Management System 
alibration Standardization Asset Management System 
etrology Automated Sys. for Uniform Recall & Reporting 
obile Facility Automated Assets Control System 
aval Vessel Register 
raft & Boat Support System 
upported Activity Supply System 
onventional Ammunition Integrated Management System 
-4/D-5 Missile History Tracking Reports 
aval Space Command Satellite Tracking 
inancial Accounting & Inventory Record System 






Table 4-4. National Defense PP&E Nonfinancial Feeder Systems 
1) The Status Quo with System Consolidation and Modification Option. 
This alternative entails the modification of current systems to incorporate 
the data elements required for fmancial reporting compliance, as well as 
the consolidation of as many as nine of the systems into four. It remains 
the "status quo" alternative because any compilation of the data from the 
11 + systems still in operation must be accomplished manually. 
2) The Data Warehousing Option. This alternative calls for all the 
modification and consolidation measures to be taken in the first option. 
Additionally, it entails the development of a data warehouse solution as an 
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interface and integration vehicle to compile and report National Defense 
data. 
3) The Defense Property Accountability System (DPAS) Option. This 
alternative permits the current critical systems to operate virtually 
unchanged in continued support of their operational communities, 
executing their original missions. As the name implies, however, this 
option involves the full implementation of DP AS as a separate, parallel 
system for recording, tracking, and reporting National Defense PP&E. 
4) The Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Option. This final, most 
revolutionary alternative entails the complete consolidation of National 
Defense systems into one or more DoN-wide ERP systems. This fully 
integrated systems approach would represent a true paradigm shift across 
the Navy, but the current ERP pilots, with which this alternative would 
work to incorporate requirements, demonstrate serious long-term 
consideration by senior DoN leadership. [Ref. 22:p. 21] 
None of the alternatives, as may now be readily apparent, include the possibility 
of either modifying the existing systems to the extent that they are themselves capable of 
integration with financial management systems, or consolidating all of the existing 
systems into one nonfinancial feeder system that performs all of the functions required by 
that asset category, as DPAS does with Personal Property PP&E. These two alternatives 
proved possible with Real Property and Personal Property respectively, but are infeasible 
due to cost, time, and technology constraints for National Defense PP&E systems and 
functions. With the known legislative requirements for an integrated system capable of 
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compliant interface with financial and accounting systems, if not a conclusive 
determination of precisely what information was required from the system, the National 
Defense Working Group elected to pursue implementation of the Data Warehousing 
Option. 
The development of a "data warehouse" application will establish a central 
information repository for the financial information compiled within the various 
disaggregate National Defense nonfinancial feeder systems, which will remain in full use 
by their respective operational communities to execute their original missions. A 
consolidating data' warehousing system provides an alternative means to capture, 
maintain, and transmit the required fmancial data without incurring the prohibitive costs 
or causing the operational disruption that would result from extensive system 
modification or replacement. [Ref. 23:pp. V-20(Volume 1), II-66,67(Volume II)] 
Progress remains slow, however, with the initiative still lacking specific parameters for 
consolidating some of the redundant systems, establishing the functional requirements of 
the data warehousing process, or determining the software requirements for system 
interface. Figure 4-3 [After Ref. 23:p. 22] illustrates the conceptualization of the Data 
Warehousing Option processes, noting potential software solutions to these issues. 
F. SUMMARY 
The dysfunctional status of DoN PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems remains the 
most critical system obstacles to continued progress and eventual compliance with 
federal financial management reform requirements. The DoN formed 13 Working 
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to them, including three teams focused upon PP&E asset categories: Real Property, 
Personal Property, and National Defense. The Navy granted the teams an unprecedented 
level of resource prioritization, but also required tangible results in the development and 
implementation of alternatives and solutions to achieve compliance with federal financial 
management reporting requirements and accounting standards. 
The Working Groups initially assessed the requirements for the implementation of 
alternative business practices and the elimination of redundant and manually intensive 
systems. Progress beyond this differs markedly among the three PP&E Working Groups, 
and the current status of their respective compliance initiatives varies significantly, due to 
dramatically different levels of asset category deficiency and complexity in the 
implementation of corrective strategy. The comparatively simple modification of 
NFADB as the Navy's existing compliant Real Property nonfmancial feeder system has 
progressed the farthest, and will be fully operational in FY 2001. The transition to DP AS 
from the multitudes of diverse Personal Property systems presented a significantly more 
complex implementation process, with recurring institutional, resourcing, and technical 
challenges, but measurable progress continues toward completion in FY 2003. The 
National Defense Asset category, with no GAAP-equivalent standards for defining, 
accounting for, or reporting PP&E, no evaluation of any critical systems' compliance 
status, and exceptional material deficiencies possessed the greatest levels of complexity 
and adversity to compliance initiatives. Progress reflects this, with the Working Group 
and KPMG still assessing one of four limited alternatives to the labor-intensive National 
Defense accounting and reporting systems structure, and thus far lacking specific 
parameters or standards guidance for its implementation. 
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The comparative complexities in executing the respective PP&E Working 
Groups' nonfinancial feeder system initiatives also surface in an examination of the price, 
or the total cost, of implementing and sustaining the outcomes. For the following 
chapter, this thesis centers on the costs incurred by DoN in its progress with PP&E 
nonfinancial feeder initiatives, as well as the anticipated future costs of the fully 
operational and federally compliant processes and systems that will ostensibly result from 
their successful completion. 
62 
V. THE PRICE OF DON PP&E NONFINANCIAL FEEDER 
SYSTEM COMPLIANCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The examination and comparison of the situations and progress achieved thus far 
in the respective PP &E nonfinancial feeder system compliance initiatives provide useful 
context for an analysis of the projected price of compliance for those efforts underway. 
This chapter focuses on those costs, from a DoN perspective, incurred in the 
implementation and sustainment of the initiative outcomes. It also addresses the levels of 
funding committed thus far to the Real Property, Personal Property, and National Defense 
Asset implementation strategies, which are not necessarily aligned with relevant cost 
projections. With such funding discrepancies and the intricacies of federal funding and 
cost accounting practices, this chapter first examines DoN budgetary accounting to 
illustrate w:Pat costs lie outside the capabilities of current Navy systems or requirements 
to track. 
B. DON FUNDING AND BUDGETARY ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND 
POLICIES 
The complexities of program funding and budgetary accounting practices and 
reporting preclude any exact determination of the full costs in implementing any of the 
three major compliance initiatives examined by this thesis. The DoN identifies its funded 
programs based upon Congress' major appropriation groups, although the Navy is 
attempting to establish a cost reporting methodology that meets the Statement of Federal 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFF AS) requirements for cost information. Funds 
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appropriated by Congress reach the DoN nonfinancial feeder system compliance 
initiative programs through General Funds, specifically used to record financial 
transactions arising under Congressional appropriations for the direction and monitoring 
of budget execution as required by budgetary accounting responsibilities. The Navy 
bases these financial data on budgetary obligations, disbursements, and collection 
transactions, as well as nonfinancial feeder systems, and thus generally records 
transactions on a cash basis rather than the SFF AS-required accrual basis. DoN makes 
accrual adjustments, instead of using a full accrual accounting basis, for major operating 
expenses in General Fund activities in an attempt to report expenses as incurred. For 
capital expenditures and other long-term assets, the Navy does not recognize an expense 
until operations consume them. [Ref. 24:pp. 4, 5] 
The existing program funding and budgetary accounting methodologies preclude 
an accurate estimate of full cost because expenses incurred due to compliance initiative 
development and progress are only recognized under the multiple, disaggregate 
appropriations from which the programs receive funding. No adequate capability exists 
to either separate those costs for accrual and scrutiny below the budget activity level or 
assign common costs to programs. Military Personnel costs, from high-ranking officers 
committed to the Working Groups to junior enlisted at the level of implementation and 
operation, are tracked only within the Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel 
Appropriations, not by direct or indirect labor attributable to a specific program for 
achieving compliance with federal reporting requirements and accounting standards. 
DoN does track its civilian personnel as Full Time Equivalents by different major 
appropriations, but this level of recording still obscures labor costs. In a manner similar 
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to the separation of labor costs, no financial system or nonfinancial feeder system 
accumulates program-specific materiel costs, overhead costs, or non-recurring and other 
costs for the compliance initiatives outside the appropriation groups and General Fund 
activities for monitoring budget execution. Funds are obligated and disbursed for costs 
incurred from research and development, purchase of systems and networking 
components, and implementation and sustainment of the systems' operations, to include 
the facilities that contain them. Such funds respectively originate in Research, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN); Other Procurement, Navy (OPN); 
and Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) and Marine Corps (OMMC) 
Appropriations, but the Navy lacks the fmancial and nonfinancial systems to collect and 
report cost information on an accrual basis or by program across appropriation groups. 
The information required for the full cost estimate of PP&E nonfinancial feeder 
systems compliance exists, to some identifiable extent, within such records of obligation 
and disbursement transactions, but the utility of its extraction is greatly diminished by 
prohibitive time and resource constraints. Further, for the National Defense PP&E 
category, as well as Personal and Real Property to a significantly lesser degree, the vast 
proportion of costs remain projected and have yet to be incurred. Also, due to the Navy's 
lack of visibility on many types of cost, as discussed, the projected resource requirements 
largely encompass costs estimated for the services of private sector contractors, who must 
and do track all relevant expenses. Thus, the following examination of "the price" of 
PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems compliance approaches cost estimates using DoN 
projected resource requirements for the implementation and sustainment of systems in 
conformity with federal reporting requirements and accounting standards. 
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C. REAL PROPERTY 
With the Naval Facilities Asset Database (NF ADB) currently in operation 
continuing to serve, after modification, as the Real Property PP&E nonfinancial feeder 
system, this category of assets costs the least in terms of compliance and receives the 
strongest level of commitment for funding projected resource requirements from the 
Navy. Table 5-l [After Ref. 25, Ref. 26] illustrates the current projected resource 
requirements through FY 2005. 
These costs exclude the price of progress achieved in FY 1999 for the 
determination of reliability for NF ADB data in terms of existence, completeness, and 
material accuracy of recorded costs, as well as that achieved in FY 1999 for the 
development of depreciation calculations and internal control modifications to the 
system, totaling approximately $750,000. They omit, as previously discussed, the labor 
costs of military, DoN civilian, and other federal civilian personnel, from Public Works 
Officers to Civil Engineers to government auditors, whose efforts greatly contributed to 
this progress and will continue to do so until the compliance initiative is complete. 
The projected resource requirements for FY 2000 through FY 2003 represent cost 
estimates for existing in-house labor and oversight contracts with Price Waterhouse 
Coopers [Ref. 27], as well as the programming and implementation of system 
modifications, including the elimination of certain controls and processing requirements 
that preclude NF ADB interface with both Expanded Access Sites and external fmancial 














Department of the,_Navy-~ea} .Property~(I'{fADB) R_e~o)ir,ce :Reqllire_me~ts($ in Thousands); 
Exp'eris~ .. - · 1-A:PPf.O~pationiF-\' 2ooq lF'Y-20Ql]EY _2oq~ IFJ>20o3JF'Y -2oo4,1ry.,2oos_ITotals;'. 
Price Waterhouse C:oopers jOI\(~' k.c_ __ 7001--··~l~J-=--?_2o~f--_·. 7321_· --~~---·-~L---'--- ·2,862 
..._, 








1'~tal, F~~a~·a 1 1 l,oo.o,_[_J~;21Q., __ _?~q,1~-- J3~~--_ ___ij_··  ___ ___!, 3,6~,~ 1 
1 T~~al; Unfund_ec}: _ J __ -_ .. _ .. e-._J. ______ ~~=----~__]_L_.  -~~------~-~l--'---·-·---· 0 1=----~L------ 0 
(l) 
~ 
a ---,3~'i62' , '.' 















outside the Facilities Systems Office, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Headquarters, and the five Engineering Field Divisions, costs also encompass the 
implementation of such additional Expanded Access Sites into the NF ADB network. 
Thus far, DoN has committed to fully funding NF ADB resource requirements. 
The significant lack of certain costs included in the projected resource 
requirements also merits discussion. The Real Property compliance initiative requires no 
sustainment funding after FY 2003, when all modification and access expansion should 
be complete, because of the limited scope and complexity in implementing change using 
an extant, standard system. Specifically, the organizational structure already exists, and 
will not change as a result of the compliance initiative, except to increase the number of 
reporting activities with access to NF ADB. The personnel at these activities already use 
NF ADB, if only through form-driven, manual correspondence, and thus need no staffing 
augmentation to perform their duties after the initial training for on-line update and query 
functions. The current nonfinancial feeder system and its on-line access terminals require 
only further modification, not replacement, rendering sustainment costs beyond those 
incurred by the previous NF ADB iteration immaterial. 
D. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The substantially greater complexity of implementing the Defense Property 
Accountability System (DPAS) throughout the Navy as the sole Personal Property 
nonfmancial feeder system certainly is reflected in the exponentially higher cost of 
compliance in comparison to the NF ADB modifications for Real Property PP&E. Much 
of this cost derives from the principal difference in implementation strategies: DPAS will 
completely replace hundreds of noncompliant, stovepipe systems, heralding a 
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fundamental change in DoN business practices, while NF ADB requires only minor 
modification and expansion as an operational, compliant system. At present, the DP AS 
implementation receives substantial funding commitments from the Navy, but funding 
for the later incremental costs of sustaining the integrated system functions is not yet 
identified. However, DoN remains unequivocally committed to funding all DP AS costs, 
including the recurring costs of sustainment, and the upcoming Program Objective 
Memorandum will address this disparity. Table 5-2 [After Ref. 25, Ref. 26] illustrates 
the current projected resource requirements for Personal Property nonfinancial feeder 
system compliance through FY 2005. 
These costs compare with those projected for Real Property in terms of excluding 
the price of progress achieved through FY 1999, totaling approximately $4.6 million. F~r 
DPAS, this progress, as discussed in Chapter IV, includes work on assessments of 
existing data reliability for existence and completeness; work on obtaining accurate 
historical cost data and converting the data to inventory and reconcile Personal Property 
records; and Marine Corps and Navy deployment of DP AS, a total of 122 sites, and 
initial subsequent inventory revisions. They omit past and future labor costs of personnel 
from the DoN, the government audit community, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DF AS), and the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), all essential ·participants in the continuing development of 
alternative Personal Property policies, operating procedures, and internal controls for the 
deployment of a system entirely new to the Navy. 
The projected resource requirements for FY 2000 through FY 2005 represent cost 
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Waterhouse Coopers entailing primarily oversight and implementation assessment 
functions, the Mantech Corporation for administration of the DP AS centralized catalogue 
and help desk operations, and other projects to establish the DoN DPAS firewall and 
conduct follow-on training for DoN personnel. [Ref. 26] The work of KPMG comprises 
by far the greatest expense to the Navy through FY 2003, when full implementation is 
currently targeted for completion. Their services center around three distinct and vital 
components of the implementation process at every activity: 
1) The Pre-Site Visit, which assesses and prepares a reporting activity for the 
arrival of the DPAS installation team, 
2) The Integrated Training and Implementation, where KPMG exercises 
oversight over accounting requirements, management controls, post-
conversion management, and other diverse compliance specifications, and 
3) The Post Deployment Review, which formally certifies an activity's 
successful completion of DP AS implementation and maintenance of 
auditable records. 
With DP AS implementation, however, comes a multitude of additional functions never 
previously required of the Personal Property nonfinancial feeder systems or their 
operators, which reflect DPAS' capabilities addressing property accountability and 
valuation, equipment utilization, and preventive maintenance scheduling. Thus, after FY 
2003, sustainment costs comprise all projected expenses, consisting of the outsourced 
centralized catalogue and help desk functions, as well as continued follow-on training. 
The Navy will incur additional costs not considered in the projected funding 
requirements as a consequence of the DPAS organizational structure. DPAS is a major 
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program of the DLA, with whom its Program Executive Office resides. The DP AS 
master database runs on a DISA system from their Regional Support Activity in Dayton, 
Ohio, where DISA controls database storage and management, and DP AS operations and 
security. Some aspects ofDPAS program management also rest with DFAS, which holds 
responsibility for guidelines on DP AS fielding, data conversion, training, and 
implementation support. [Ref. 20] 
The DPAS program itself thus functions as a "virtual" organization, but DLA 
controls all central design activities, such as software development and maintenance, and 
customer support, which receive prioritization as a result of quarterly votes from a forum 
that represents DoD components employing DP AS. Currently, DoN possesses a 
comparative advantage in this forum, as both the Navy and the Marine Corps hold voting 
rights. The cost of all resulting modifications is not relevant to their prioritization, but 
such expenses are indirectly passed on to the DoD components using DP AS, including 
DoN. Costs incurred by the DPAS organizational structure are realized in the DLA 
Working Capital Fund, which translates these costs to users via its overall variable rate. 
Thus, while the Navy certainly pays in the long term for system administration and 
modification, the expensing process obscures specific costs and consequently defies 
projection in funding requirements. 
E. NATIONAL DEFENSE 
The highest levels of complexity and challenge inherent in the implementation of 
a compliant National Defense PP&E nonfinancial feeder system structure are not 
reflected in the projected funding requirements, compared with the price of DPAS 
implementation. This is attributable to two principal factors: 
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1) The projected costs are based upon the aforementioned Data Warehousing 
Option, which entails modification and consolidation of existing systems 
and subsequent development of a separate data warehouse to serve as an 
interfacing, integrated system for reporting financial data, rather than the 
implementation of an entirely new integrated feeder system that 
completely replaces all previous systems, such as DP AS; and 
2) The projected costs represent only initial estimates for system 
modifications and software development, when preliminary assessments 
of the critical National Defense systems for data accuracy remain 
unfinished, and progress on the development and parameters of the data 
warehouse construct remains at conceptualization. 
The uncertain scope of the modifications required to existing nonfinancial feeder systems 
and the preliminary development stage of the data warehouse system render the resulting 
cost estimate comparatively unreliable, and subject to significant volatility. This 
potentially explains the Navy's reluctance to commit funding to the National Defense 
PP&E compliance initiative, particularly in the context of an asset category where no 
conclusive standard for accounting and reporting requirements yet exists. Table 5-3 
[After Ref. 25, Ref. 26] illustrates the current projected resource requirements for 
implementing the National Defense Data Warehouse Option to achieve nonfinancial 
feeder system compliance through FY 2005. 
The National Defense PP&E Working Group achieved all material progress in FY 
2000, and Table 5-3 thus contains an approximation of all contractor costs incurred to 
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price of progress achieved through FY 1999. Similar to the previous two projected 
funding requirement estimates, however, it does exclude past and future labor costs of 
Navy military and government audit community personnel, whose efforts are integral to 
the development, implementation, and validation of any resulting system structure that 
revolutionizes National Defense accounting and reporting. 
The projected resource requirements for FY 2000 through FY 2005 contain one 
comparatively accurate cost estimate for an existing contract with KPMG Peat Marwick 
through FY 2003. Contractor services entail project oversight, analysis of reporting 
alternatives, and both system and business process assessments to establish the extent of 
modification required to capture, maintain, and transmit the required data elements. 
Other funding requirement estimates represent the specific costs of developing the data 
warehouse financial information repository and associated interface network 
requirements and parameters. This includes procuring the necessary system hardware 
and software to interface with National Defense nonfinancial feeder systems and 
integrate with DF AS fmancial systems, and establishing an organizational structure for 
the efficient and effective administration and operation of the resulting system. 
Of these non-KPMG costs, the National Defense Working Group projections 
anticipate that only the incremental organizational expense of administering and 
operating the data warehouse system constitutes a recurring cost required to sustain the 
compliant reporting and accounting functions. Incremental increases in sustainment costs 
are immaterial at the level of the disaggregate National Defense nonfinancial feeder 
systems, where their respective operational communities continue to employ largely the 
same systems executing their original missions, with no staffing or system augmentations 
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thus necessary after the initial modifications and training. Thus far, however, DoN 
remains committed to funding only half of KPMG's estimated costs in FY 2001, and 
nothing beyond this pending further development of the Data Warehouse Option and 
more conclusive guidance on National Defense accounting and reporting standards. 
Before selection of the Data Warehouse Option as the compliance initiative's 
alternative approach to account for and report National Defense PP&E, the Working 
Group and KPMG established a field of four conceptually viable options, as discussed in 
Chapter IV. Although it is unlikely that the Data Warehouse Option will be replaced by 
one of the other three, this examination of the price of compliance warrants an overview 
of the remaining alternatives, and concurrently a comparison with previous estimates for 
the selected option. Table 5-4 [After Ref. 28:p. 20] illustrates KPMG's comparative 
evaluation of the four alternative approaches as of late August 2000. 
The KPMG comparison of alternatives in the evaluation matrix highlights several 
relevant points. The Navy did not select the Data Warehouse Option based upon the 
lowest estimated costs of implementation and sustainment - in the short term, only the 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Option is more expensive for implementation, 
although in the long term only the Status Quo option is less for sustainment. Further, the 
estimated time required for the Data Warehouse Option implementation is comparable to 
both the Status Quo and DP AS alternatives. 
The selected option becomes distinct from the others, rather, among the listed 
factors that define the implementation process itself. Only the Status Quo Option, which 
entails similar modifications to existing nonfmancial feeder systems, also prevents an 
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accountability functions remain vital across major naval warfighting components. Unlike 
the Status Quo Option, however, only the ERP and Data Warehouse alternatives achieve 
the principle federal reform requirement for a completely automated, integrated financial 
management system. DP AS is also considered inadequate, due to its inability to interface 
with existing systems or to accept National Defense assets, and the subsequent 
requirement for manually feeding data into DP AS before entering the automated 
reporting process. All options compare approximately the same in terms of redundant 
system consolidation, although the ERP is slightly superior in its complete system 
transition to a DoN-wide system, while DPAS is marginally inferior due to its inability to 
replicate all the functions performed by National Defense nonfinancial feeders. From 
this perspective, DoN selected the Data Warehouse Option because it represents the only 
alternative that minimizes operational disruption while it achieves compliance with 
federal requirements for automation and integration within time and cost constraints. 
F. COST ESTIMATE VARIANCES 
Although the majority of the costs estimated in the projected resource funding 
requirements have yet to be incurred, a comparison of the estimate modifications over the 
past year alone illustrates their tenuousness and merits further examination as a factor in 
the price of compliance. Volatility reflecting escalations in cost appears to coincide with 
DoN reluctance to commit to funding projected compliance initiative costs. However, 
high variances between FY 1999 and FY 2000 estimates are not confmed to 
implementation programs still in the preliminary stages, such as the National Defense 
Data Warehouse, or to projections in the outyears where past progress in the established 
compliance initiatives becomes a primary determinant of cost. Table 5-5 [After Ref. 25, 
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Ref. 26, Ref. 28:p. 20, Ref. 29:p. 7], which summarizes the current projected funding 
requirements through FY 2005 for all three PP&E compliance initiatives, illustrates the 
cost estimate variances through a comparison with June 1999 DoN estimates for Real and 
Personal Property, and with worst-case August 2000 KPMG estimates for National 
Defense. 
This comparison demonstrates that cost estimate variances represent a· significant, 
uncertain factor in the determination of the price of compliance for DoN PP&E 
nonfinancial feeder systems, potentially to both the benefit and detriment of the Navy. 
Projected funding requirement volatility only heightens the necessity for preservation of 
the institutional momentum that has thus far sustained the DoN commitment to achieving 
compliance with federal accounting and reporting requirements for nonfinancial feeder 
systems. 
G. SPECULATIVE COSTS 
While existing program funding and budgetary accounting methodologies 
preclude accurate estimates of full costs for reasons previously addressed, speculation on 
the significance and amounts of untracked but material cost elements may serve to 
establish the closest approximation to such an estimate obtainable under time and 
resource constraints. Cost elements may be divided at the most general, relevant level 
into implementation costs, alternatively labeled investment, transition, or non-recurring 
costs, and sustainment costs, also known as recurring costs. Separate examination of the 
respective PP&E compliance initiatives' implementation and sustainment costs provides 
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1. Real Property 
a. Implementation Costs 
With the comparatively minor requirement for modification of a currently 
operational nonfinancial feeder system, the NF ADB Real Property compliance initiative 
will not incur any apparent material, uncaptured costs upon which to speculate. 
Implementation costs projected through FY 2003 encompass the specific labor costs of 
Price Waterhouse Coopers and contracted programmers engaged in oversight, data 
sampling, and modification of software, processes, and internal controls, all accounted 
for under OMN and RDTEN appropriations. The labor-intensive efforts of DoN Civil 
Engineer and Public Works personnel in conjunction with the contractors proved critical 
to the Real Property compliance initiative's progress, but did not represent additional 
resource augmentation of any activity, and thus not any incremental cost beyond standard 
staffmg requirements. Similarly, NF ADB will incur no incremental materiel costs with 
the additional Expanded Access Sites coming on-line, because the web-based update and 
query access gained by the reporting activities functions using existing systems and 
networks, and requires no additional personnel to operate. 
b. Sustainment Costs 
No material sustainment costs exist beyond the FY 2003 completion of 
implementation, also due to the limited scope and complexity of the NF ADB 
modifications. A functional organizational structure that maintains the use of NF ADB 
already exists, and the system interface modifications and web-based access terminals do 
not call for claimant staffing augmentations to sustain operations. Without the presence 
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of significant recurring costs or escalating investment costs from unanticipated 
contingencies, speculative costs do not factor into any Real Property compliance 
initiative full cost estimate. In their absence, implementation progress remains the most 
advanced among the major PP&E asset categories. 
2. Personal Property 
a. Implementation Costs 
In contrast, the complexities associated with the DP AS replacement of 
noncompliant Personal Property systems across the Navy, and the consequent change in 
business culture and practices, suggest the consideration of speculative costs in a full cost 
estimate of the price of compliance. Implementation costs projected through FY 2003 
include the specific labor costs of KPMG Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse Coopers 
for a multitude of oversight and implementation assessment functions, as well as the 
establishment of the DoN DP AS firewall, entirely accounted for under OMN and OMMC 
appropriations. Although DPAS is new to the DoN, the Navy incurred no labor costs 
under RDTEN due to the nonfinancial feeder systems' previously operational status 
within other DoD components and agencies. Similar to the NF ADB expansion, DP AS 
runs on existing computer systems and networks, incurring no incremental materiel costs 
from operations. 
Unlike the situation for NF ADB, however, where Real Property data were 
determined to be materially accurate and reliable, DP AS implementation requires a labor-
intensive complete physical inventory of Personal Property prior to the nonfinancial 
feeder system data transition. Although the DP AS initiative does not track the associated 
labor costs, they cannot be considered an incremental cost of compliance because the 
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requirement for conducting complete Personal Property inventories every three years 
existed prior to DP AS implementation. While the past requirement allowed the inventory 
to be conducted over the span of three years at a pace determined by the claimant, the 
current prerequisite to data transition does not alter the total expense incurred for 
conducting the inventory, only the timing of the total expense. Accelerating recognition 
of the labor cost to the present simply eliminates it as a future· cost, rendering the 
inventory requirement immaterially different from the status quo. As a result, the costs of 
conducting inventories cannot be construed as a speculative cost of compliance. 
b. Sustainment Costs 
Significant DP AS recurring costs exist beyond the FY 2003 targeted 
completion of implementation. The sustainment ofDPAS requires the administration and 
maintenance of the centralized catalog and help desk operations, as well as the 
establishment of an intensive follow-on training regimen, also fully accounted for under 
OMN and OMMC appropriations. Beyond these support requirements, however, the 
transition of the Personal Property reporting activity organizational structure does not call 
for additional personnel, and thus incremental labor costs, to sustain operations, despite 
the fundamental change in the system environment. With the efficiencies incorporated in 
the centralized support measures that represent the cost of DP AS sustainment, prior 
claimant staffmg levels are considered sufficient to employ DP AS to the extent of its 
multifunctional capabilities for property and equipment management, in addition to 
accounting and reporting functions. 
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c. Speculative Costs 
This breakdown of implementation and sustainment costs for funding 
requirements omits any potentially speculative costs material to a full cost estimate, but 
other expenses incurred become quite relevant. DPAS is a major DLA program, as 
previously discussed in this chapter, with aspects of its management and functionality 
administered by several DoD entities that serve the common requirements of all DoD 
military components and agencies employing DP AS. While broad speculation on the 
Navy's impact in the DLA Working Capital Fund expensing process that obscures 
specific costs and translates them to users via the general rate lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis, the cost of the DPAS program's extensive role in implementing the 
nonfinancial feeder system at over 900 DoN reporting activities merits speculation. 
The work of DPAS Implementation Teams at DoN reporting activities 
comprises the implementation costs directly attributable to the Navy through FY 2003. 
DPAS Implementation Teams consist of two federal civilian employees, with different 
levels of experience and seniority, typically of the General Schedule (GS) 13 and 11 pay 
grades. [Ref. 30] The teams' functions, performed during deployment to every DoN 
reporting activity in the DPAS implementation process, encompass primarily data 
conversion, both on-site and through the master database, and implementation training, 
which focuses on technical aspects of the system in contrast with KPMG's concurrent 
focus on policies and procedures. [Ref. 20:p. 13] DPAS Implementation Teams work 
closely in conjunction with KPMG during the implementation process at every activity, 
in fact, and the four distinct phases of their efforts are directly connected to KPMG's 
aforementioned services as follows: 
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1) The Command Brief, which follows the KPMG Pre-Site Visit, is a one day 
event where the DP AS team briefs the reporting activity on the impending 
implementation schedule, and demonstrates DP AS functionality in order 
to explain the advantages of its employment; 
2) The Implementation Site Visit, for which the reporting activity prepared as 
a result of the Pre-Site Visit, is a two day event that tests the existing 
hardware, verifies the users, initiates the data mapping, and determines the 
data conversion method to be employed; 
3) The Implementation-in-Process Phase, which does not require the on-site 
presence of the DP AS team, is a 60-90 day period after the 
Implementation Site Visit where the team develops and executes 
conversion programs for the reporting activities while remaining available 
to the activity as it reconciles data errors and downloads DP AS software; 
4) The Integrated Training and Implementation, which is conducted in 
concert with KPMG, is an intensive five day iteration that finally loads the 
site data, executes the data conversion to DP AS, and provides the users 
with technical and operational training. [Ref. 20:p. 21] 
This level of information allows for the speculation of costs incurred by 
the DP AS Implementation Teams in the course of establishing DoN Personal Property 
PP&E compliance with federal accounting and reporting standards at over 900 reporting 
activities. Development of a cost estimation methodology to determine a speculative cost 
entails assumptions regarding the team members' labor costs, transportation costs, and 
the number of activities to which the teams will be deployed. 
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Labor costs may be calculated by determining the full costs of employing 
a GS-13 and a GS-11 respectively over a period of one year, dividing that amount by 
2080 hours, representing one Full Time Equivalent or workyear, to arrive at an effective 
hourly rate, and multiplying that subsequent amount by the number of hours, including 
travel time, estimated to have been spent dedicated to DPAS implementation at DoN 
reporting activities. The average full costs of either pay grade are comprised of basic 
pay, the actual salary paid to employees during regular scheduled work hours and leave; 
locality pay, an additional percentage of basic pay added to that amount based upon the 
geographic area of employment; premium pay, any compensation for work in excess of 
the regularly established work period; benefits pay, the government's share of retirement, 
insurance, and social security costs; and separation pay. [Ref. 31] 
For Defense Agencies other than the military components, the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management considers, on average, premium pay to equal 4.88% of basic 
pay, benefit pay to equal24.3% of basic pay, and separation pay to equal 2.63% of basic 
pay. This specific cost estimate assumes locality pay to equal 9.05% of basic pay, based 
upon the location ofthe DPAS Program Executive Office in the Washington-Baltimore, 
DC-MD-V A-WV locality pay area. [Ref. 3 2] This results in the following formula: 
Full Annual Civilian Employee Cost= BaP + PP + BeP + SP + LP, where: 
BaP = Basic Pay 
PP = Premium Pay= BP x .0488 
BeP =Benefit Pay= BP x .243 
SP = Separation Pay= BP x .0263 
LP = Locality Pay = BP x .0905 
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For a GS-13 Step 1 in FY 2000, this formula results in: 
55,837 + 2,725 + 13,568 + 1,469 + 5,053 = $78,652 per year 
For a GS-11 Step 1 in FY 2000, this formula results in: 
39,178 + 1,912 + 9,520 + 1,030 + 3,546 = $55,186 per year 
Dividing by 2,080 hours in one workyear results in the following labor costs per hour: 
GS-13: $78,652/2,080 hours= $37.81 per hour 
GS-11: $55,186/2,080 hours= $26.53 per hour 
The four phases of DPAS Implementation Team work specify the number 
of days spent working on-site at every reporting activity, with the exception of the 
Implementation-in-Process Phase, which does not require their on-site presence. This 
cost estimate methodology assumes that every day on-site comprises eight hours of work 
per team member, and that every day of travel to and from the reporting activity is 
charged as eight hours of work. It also assumes, conservatively, that the 60-90 day 
Implementation-in-Process Phase requires an average of three days, or 24 hours, of work 
per team member dedicated to a specific reporting activity. Given these assumptions, 
each team member spends 17 workdays, or 136 hours, dedicated to working on the 
implementation process for each DoN reporting activity: including travel time, three days 
for the Command Brief, four days for the Implementation Site Visit, three days for the 
Implementation-in-Process Phase, which assumes no travel, and seven days for the 
Integrated Training and Implementation. Multiplying the number of hours worked per 
site by the respective labor costs per hour results in the following full labor costs for team 
members per site: 
GS-13: 136 hours x $37.81 per hour= $5,142.16 per site 
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GS-11: 136 hours x $26.53 per hour = $3,608.08 per site 
Further development of the cost estimation methodology requires 
additional assumptions regarding the number of activities to which the teams will be 
deployed and the average travel cost per site visit. Although over 900 reporting activities 
are estimated to eventually implement DP AS by FY 2003, this cost estimate will use 900 
as the basis for calculations in the absence of a conclusive higher number. Multiplying 
the full labor costs of team members per site by the number of sites yields the following 
total labor costs by pay grade for DPAS Implementation Teams: 
GS-13: $5,142.16 per site x 900 sites= $4,627,944 
GS-11: $3,608.08 per site x 900 sites= $3,247,272 
For estimating average travel costs per site visit, this methodology will use the amount 
estimated by KPMG for its own DPAS site visits, accepted by DoN for FY 2001: $2,000 
per team member per site visit. [Ref. 33] DPAS Implementation Teams must travel to 
the reporting activities for the Command Brief, the Implementation Site Visit, and the 
Integrated Training and Implementation, resulting in three visits per team member per 
site, or six total visits per site. Multiplying the number of total visits per site by the 
number of sites by the average travel cost per site visit yields the following total travel 
costs: 
6 visits per site x 900 sites x $2,000 per site visit= $10,800,000 
The sum of labor and travel costs results in the following total cost: 
$4,627,944 + $3,247,272 + $10,800,000 = $18,675,216 
This amount represents the speculative total implementation costs incurred by the DP AS 
Implementation Teams in the course of establishing DoN Personal Property PP&E 
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compliance with federal accounting and reporting standards at over 900 reporting 
activities. While the precise cost of this aspect of DoN DP AS implementation cannot be 
determined with the Navy's accounting and financial systems, and the DLA incorporates 
such costs into its Working Capital Fund general rate, its significance remains 
undeniable. Referencing Table 5-2, this speculative incremental cost of Personal 
Property compliance equals 49.2% of the total projected DPAS resource requirement of 
$3 7.969 million for implementation and sustainment costs from FY 2000 through FY 
2005, a total which excludes this estimated cost. Even with the presence of significant 
recurring costs and a diverse array of institutional and technological challenges 
potentially escalating investment costs, speculative costs represent a material factor in the 
Personal Property compliance initiative full cost estimate. 
3. National Defense 
a. Implementation Costs 
For the National Defense Data Warehousing compliance initiative, the 
vast majority of costs considered in the projected funding requirements are speculative 
costs. As previously discussed in this chapter, they primarily represent initial estimates 
for system and internal control modifications, and software development of an automated 
central repository that remains without operating parameters. In contrast to both Real and 
Personal.Property compliance initiatives, National Defense implementation costs extend 
through FY 2005, although compliance with federal accounting and reporting standards 
for nonfinancial feeder systems is still expected by the FY 2003 target completion date. 
Such costs include KPMG Peat Marwick labor costs for oversight, analysis of 
alternatives, and process assessments, hardware and software materiel costs for procuring 
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the data warehouse system and network, and systems interface research costs for 
developing the required interfaces with and modifications to existing operational 
nonfinancial feeder systems. Just as the other major PP&E asset categories, however, 
projected resource requirements account for these implementation costs under the OMN, 
OPN, and RDTEN appropriations, respectively. 
h. Sustainment Costs 
National Defense Data Warehouse compliance initiative sustainment costs 
are anticipated beyond FY 2005, but thus far only at the level of the data warehouse 
repository itself, where its administration and operation constitute an incremental, 
recurring expense over the operation of current disaggregate, noncompliant systems. 
Again, projections are fully accounted for under the OMN appropriation. Under the Data 
Warehouse Option, operational communities will employ largely the same systems with 
no additional staffing required after their modification, so no incremental sustainment 
costs arise from the National Defense reporting activity organizational structures. 
c. Speculative Costs 
Despite this comprehensive consideration of implementation and 
sustainment costs across appropriations, potential speculative costs prove quite material 
in a full cost estimate of the price of compliance, and are particularly relevant to thesis 
conclusions. Much of the complexity and challenge inherent to the National Defense 
compliance initiative, and its resulting lack of progress, is attributable to the absence of 
any conclusive accounting and reporting standard for National Defense PP&E after the 
abortive FY 1998 F ASAB attempt. Cost speculation, therefore, centers on the potential 
resolution of the major deficiency that precludes further progress in establishing the 
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functional requirements for the data warehouse system or determining the necessary 
parameters for interface with National Defense Asset nonfinancial feeder systems. 
Examination of all the potential accounting and reporting requirements the 
F ASAB might establish and the subsequent costs of each in terms of DoN compliance 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a past estimate of the price of DoD 
compliance for one such alternative provides a reasonable basis for a DoN speculative 
cost, which will be incurred to some extent unless the F ASAB successfully establishes 
the permissive standards it was forced to abandon in FY 1998. During the public 
hearings on the draft of that F ASAB proposal, DoD representatives testifying in favor of 
the elimination of the National Defense PP&E valuation requirement presented a cost 
estimation of $100 million for determination of the value of all existing weapon systems. 
[Ref. 14:pp. 37, 38] DoN controlled almost 50% of total DoD National Defense Asset 
value as of FY 1997, the last time a requirement was enforced for reporting it [Ref. 1 :p. 
19, Ref. 21:p. 1], enabling a rough approximation of the estimated cost to the Navy for 
determining the value ofNational Defense PP&E at $50 million. 
While no recognized requirement for such a valuation endeavor exists, the 
legislative momentum for financial management reform within the executive departments 
and agencies will soon compel the F ASAB to establish a fiscally responsible standard. 
This significant expense thus represents a speculative incremental cost of National 
Defense compliance initiative implementation in the absence of such an accounting and 
reporting standard, but it will be incurred to some extent with the passage of any but the 
most permissive standard. Referencing Table 5-3, this speculative cost potentially equals 
as much as 343.8% of the total current projected Data Warehouse resource requirement 
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of $14.544 million for implementation and sustainment costs from FY 2000 through FY 
2005. For National Defense Assets, without the existence of an enforceable accounting 
and reporting standard and only the preliminary development of systems alternatives, this 
speculative cost of complying with an emergent standard represents not merely a material 
factor in the National Defense compliance initiative full cost estimate, but the 
predominant one. 
4. The Speculative Price of Compliance 
Table 5-6 illustrates the full cost of compliance, as determined within the scope 
and constraints of this thesis, for DoN PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems from initiation 
in FY 1999, or FY 2000 for National Defense PP&E, through FY 2005. Real Property, 
Personal Property, and National Defense compliance initiative costs are divided into 
implementation and sustainment costs, where applicable, and totals include past, present, 
and projected funding requirements that can be tracked specifically by the Navy to 
appropriations, and material speculative costs that either are beyond DoN capabilities to 
trace or are outside the current scope of implementation strategies. The previously 
discussed speculative implementation cost totals for Personal Property are apportioned 
approximately among fiscal years based upon the Navy's DPAS site implementation 
schedule, and the National Defense speculative implementation cost is evenly 
apportioned from FY 2001 through FY 2003 based upon the DoN target timeframe for 
completion. Sustainment costs for Personal Property and National Defense initiatives 
should continue beyond FY 2005 at approximately the given amounts. Through a 
comparison with the total PP&E current cost estimate on Table 5-5, which considers only 
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speculative costs represents 23 5.1% of the noninclusive estimate, demonstrating i..l}e 
potential impact of such invisible or unanticipated costs and the importance of planning 
for their contingencies in an environment of fiscal constraint. 
H. SUMMARY 
From a DoN perspective, the price of PP&E nonfinancial feeder system 
compliance proves difficult to ascertain with high levels of confidence. As a result, the 
Navy has not committed to funding the resource requirements for the implementation and 
sustainment of the initiative outcomes in a manner aligned with relevant cost projections. 
Some elements of the implementation strategies' full costs lie outside the Navy's current 
capability to capture, due to the complexities of program funding and budgetary 
accounting practices and reporting. Ironically, the Navy lacks the financial and 
nonfinancial systems to collect and report cost information on an accrual basis or by 
program from across appropriation groups for determining the full cost of achieving 
compliance with these very systems. Thus, this thesis uses DoN projected resource 
requirements for the implementation and sustainment of systems in conformity with 
federal reporting requirements and accounting standards for examining "the price" of 
PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems compliance. 
Real Property costs the least to achieve compliance and receives the strongest 
level of funding commitment due to the continuity of the Naval Facilities Asset Database 
(NFADB), continuing to serve after modification as the Real Property PP&E nonfinancial 
feeder system. Personal Property compliance, in contrast, comes at an exponentially 
higher cost due to the substantially greater complexity of implementing the Defense 
Property Accountability System (DPAS) throughout the Navy as the sole Personal 
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Property nonfinancial feeder system. The complete replacement by DPAS ofhundreds.of 
noncompliant, stovepipe systems, however, will effect a fundamental change in DoN 
business practices, but funding is thus far not committed for future costs of sustaining the 
integrated system functions. National Defense compliance differs from either previous 
implementation paradigm, with the inherent complexity and challenge of a unique 
systems structure implementation not comparatively reflected in the projected funding 
requirements. The uncertain scope of the modifications required to existing nonfinancial 
feeder systems, the preliminary development stage of the data warehouse system, and the 
lack of National Defense accounting and reporting standards also render the resulting cost 
estimate comparatively unreliable. 
The estimate's demonstrated volatility explains the Navy's reluctance to commit 
funding to the National Defense PP&E compliance initiative. This variance observed in 
cost estimates, to an extent for each category of assets, represents a material factor itself 
in any attempted determination of the price of compliance. While existing program 
funding and budgetary accounting methodologies preclude accurate estimates of full 
costs, speculation on the significance and amounts of untracked but material cost 
elements provides a more realistic determination of full costs and demonstrates the 
potentially destabilizing impact of such costs to program execution in the absence of a 
capability to plan for or anticipate them. 
The following and final chapter concludes the thesis. With this examination of the 
price of implementing and sustaining the outcomes, and its established relationship with 
the complexities and progress achieved in executing the respective PP&E Working 
Groups' compliance initiatives, closure centers on these factors' greater significance to 
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successful completion. Also, the fmal chapter considers the multitude of opportunities 
for further research in the area of DoN nonfinancial feeder system implementation 
strategy, a field of paramount importance in the establishment of auditable financial 
statements and a sustainable, integrated financial management system. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis examined the costs of achieving PP&E nonfinancial feeder system 
compliance within the DoN, as well as the comparative progress achieved by distinct 
compliance initiatives. These DoN compliance initiatives resulted from directives 
contained in the DoD Implementation Strategies and Biennial Financial Management 
Improvement Plan (BFMIP), themselves a response to unprecedented legislative 
mandates for federal fiscal reform. With the DoN controlling approximately 50 percent 
of DoD PP&E assets, and with an estimated 80 percent of the financial data required to 
prepare auditable fmancial statements originating in these systems, few if any subjects 
prove more relevant to achieving the objectives of this legislation. 
Chapter II first established the significance of nonfinancial feeder systems in the 
context of interrelated congressional legislation enacted over the past decade requiring 
federal agencies to institute corporate business practices, emphasizing proper reporting of 
fmancial data and production of auditable financial statements. The Chief Financial 
Officers Act of 1990 initially set out the framework for federal financial management 
reform that required the integration of accounting and financial systems, the publication 
of fmancial reports, and the establishment of chief financial officers in ten departments 
and agencies. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 additionally called 
for annual performance plans and reports to measure outcomes. The Government 
Management Reform Act of 1994 expanded the requirements of all fiscal reform 
legislation to encompass all 24 federal agencies, with an FY 1997 deadline for the first 
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consolidated government-wide financial statement. Mandates for the disclosure of all 
financial data through integrated, CFO-compliant systems, as well as the status of all 
noncompliant systems, resulted from the Federal Financial Management Improvement 
Act of 1996. This prompted the requirement within the FY 1998 Defense Authorization 
Act for the BFMIP itself, addressing all aspects of DoD financial management but 
specifically targeting what became recognized as the predominant obstacle to 
compliance: at least 70 nonfmancial feeder systems critical to asset accountability and 
financial reporting requirements, that were neither intended to comply with accounting 
standards nor to integrate with DoD financial management systems, and were incapable 
of doing so. 
Chapter III focused on DoD PP&E nonfmancial feeder systems, determined by 
this thesis as the most critical due to both their collective responsibility for over $1 
trillion in assets and their vital importance to operational military commands in direct 
support of mission requirements and successful mission execution. From a financial 
management perspective, however, pervasive feeder system deficiencies are largely 
responsible for federal auditors' disclaimers of opinion on DoD financial statements, 
while PP&E dispersion, volume, and diversity exacerbate difficulties in resolving 
accountability and reporting issues. DoD developed short-term Implementation 
Strategies beyond the BFMIP to address the deficiencies and employ interim measures to 
achieve compliance with federal financial management legislation. 
This chapter examined the major PP&E categories of Real Property, Personal 
Property, and National Defense Assets, collectively defined in Statements of Federal 
Financial Accounting Standards Nos. 6 and 8. Auditors determined that the Real 
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Property databases maintained materially reliable and accurate data, but systemic 
Personal Property database weaknesses required a strategy modification and the 
deployment of the Defense Property Accountability System (DP AS) as the sole DoD-
wide replacement. At the DoD level, National Defense Asset requirements for 
accountability and reporting remained an unresolved, controversial issue of potentially 
tremendous fiscal magnitude. 
Chapter IV narrowed still further in focus to the DoN, separately evaluating the 
progress achieved thus far under PP&E nonfmancial feeder system initiatives, in the 
context of both the different obstacles to compliance in the three asset categories and the 
Navy's organizational strategy for confronting them. In response to DoD Implementation 
Strategies, DoN formed three unique high-level, subject-matter expert Working Groups 
to specifically address the feeder system deficiencies within the Real Property, Personal 
Property, and National Defense Asset PP&E categories. The subsequent measures of 
progress among the teams, however, and thus the current status of their respective 
compliance initiatives, contrasted significantly due to divergent levels of data reliability 
and accuracy, extant feeder system deficiencies, and complexity in implementing 
solutions. 
For Real Property, the Navy possessed an existing, compliant nonfmancial feeder 
system, NF ADB, containing materially reliable and accurate data and requiring 
comparatively minor modification and expansion. The compliance initiative for this 
category thus has progressed the farthest, with expectations of certification and 
operational capability in FY 2001. Personal Property presented a significantly more 
complex challenge, centered on the Navy-wide transition from numerous and diverse 
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noncompliant systems with defective data to DPAS, a single, integrated, and unfamiliar 
nonfmancial feeder system. Recurring institutional resistance to change, personnel 
resource shortfalls, and technical conflicts plague implementation as a result, but 
measurable progress continues toward the official FY 2003 estimated completion. 
National Defense Assets, with no enforceable accounting or reporting standards, no 
evaluation of critical systems and data compliance status, and remarkable material 
deficiencies, presented the highest levels of complexity and uncertainty. Compliance 
initiative progress reflected this adversity, still limited to assessment of a potential 
alternative to the current labor-intensive accounting and reporting systems structure, and 
thus far lacking specific parameters or standards for implementation. 
Chapter V maintained the thesis focus on the three PP&E nonfinancial feeder 
systems, but transitioned to a comparative examination of the costs resulting from 
implementing and sustaining the compliance initiative outcomes. "The price" of 
compliance proved impossible to determine with high confidence levels, due to the 
transient status of initiatives, program funding and budgetary accounting practices, lack 
of current DoN system capabilities to capture full costs, and thesis time and resource 
constraints. However, while specific factors precluded precise estimates of full costs, the 
inclusion of speculation on the significance and amounts of untracked but material cost 
elements provided a more realistic determination of full costs and demonstrated their 
potentially destabilizing impact. 
Using DoN projected resource requirements for systems implementation and 
sustainment to study the costs of compliance, this thesis predictably found the Real 
Property modification and expansion of the NF ADB to cost the least, attributable to the 
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limited extent of the deficiencies and the requisite solutions. Personal Property 
compliance, in contrast, comes at an exponentially higher cost because of the 
complexities in DP AS' replacement of all previous databases and the resulting shift in 
DoN business practices. National Defense cost estimates for the Data Warehouse 
alternative did not directly correspond to the complexity of the implementation solution, 
as with Real and Personal Property, or the magnitude of the assets' valuation. However, 
substantial uncertainty pervades these estimates, due to the preliminary stages of 
determining data warehouse parameters and existing system modification, as well as the 
lack of conclusive National Defense accounting and reporting standards. Inclusion of 
this speculative cost, in particular, is imminently relevant to current and future DoN 
funding requirements, and such a cost will be incurred to some extent with the passage of 
any but the most permissive standard. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Thesis conclusions center appropriately upon the price, the progress, and the 
eventual success of DoN PP&E nonfinancial feeder systems compliance initiatives. 
From a general perspective, these efforts specifically address the requirements of DoD 
Implementation Strategies, the relatively short-term development of interim 
methodologies for achieving a level of compliance sufficient to obtain a more favorable 
audit opinion on consolidated financial statements until the sustainable financial 
management systems and objectives of the BFMIP are realized and operational. 
Pervasive, complex financial management problems will remain, however, and the DoN 
must maintain the reform momentum beyond the unqualified opinions and 
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Implementation Strategies if it is to institute systems and processes that provide 
consistent, reliable financial information vital to senior decision makers. 
That said, DoN senior financial management leadership effectively recognizes the 
critical necessity to simultaneously address the greater sustainment issues articulated in 
the BFMIP and legislative reform mandates. For the first time, an unprecedented 
strategic imperative to establish long-term financial management solutions and best 
business practices is expected to achieve implementation, an imperative given 
unparalleled legitimacy by engagement of both independent private sector accounting 
firms and the government audit community in a collaborative effort. The Navy's 
organizational strategy, permitting consideration of cross-functional and private sector 
solutions, resulted in the formation of well-resourced, functional expert Working Groups 
intrinsically motivated to develop and implement best, potentially revolutionary, business 
practices. Interestingly, the DoN's unique inclusion of audit community representatives 
within its Working Groups may prove to be one of the most valuable aspects of this 
organizational strategy, by incorporating the validation of alternative compliance 
measures from their perspective at every stage of consideration. 
1. Real Property 
The compliance initiative entailing the modification and expansion of the NFADB 
represented an ideal situation for achieving compliance, at least in the context of short-
term objectives. The presence of an operational, substantially compliant nonfmancial 
feeder system containing materially reliable and accurate data on a well-established asset 
category proved critical to the comparatively extensive progress achieved and reduction 
in implementation costs. 
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Beyond this central significance to the successful completion of the Real Property 
compliance initiative, NFADB's preservation also harnessed the goodwill and 
contribution of the civil engineering and public works personnel required to maintain the 
database, or its replacement. This powerful intangible factor resulted in their full-scale 
adoption of and participation in the implementation strategy to achieve compliance with 
federal accounting and reporting requirements, beginning with the Navy Engineering 
Officer chairing the Real Property Working Group. Real Property progress and resource 
requirements may also illustrate then, that securing the intangible support of the 
operational community with minimal disruption to operations proved to be a good 
investment. 
2. Personal Property 
The Personal Property compliance initiative, in contrast, apparently represented a 
worst-case scenario for successful implementation. Indeed, with the replacement of over 
a hundred noncompliant nonfinancial feeder systems at over nine hundred activities by a 
single system entirely new to the Navy, DPAS implementation complexity exists on a 
higher order of magnitude than that for NF ADB modification. The limited progress and 
enormous, escalating cost of DP AS implementation in comparison to NF ADB result 
directly from the unparalleled scope of the Navy effort, which will fundamentally 
revolutionize Personal Property accounting and reporting with the singular DP AS 
standard throughout the DoN. 
Price and progress remain the basic, tangible or measurable factors for evaluation 
of DP AS implementation success, but intangible elements apparently possess a 
substantial and adverse influence over them that threatens the viability of the FY 2003 
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target completion date. Unlike the NF ADB situation, where modification of an existing, 
familiar system garnered the support of the operational communities, none of the 
multitudes of Personal Property reporting activities retained the use of the nonfinancial 
feeder systems specifically developed to support their respective mission requirements. 
Institutional resistance to change, resource shortfalls, and technology impediments are all 
manifestations, to an extent, of apathy or antipathy to the disruptive DP AS transition, all 
potentially overcome by reporting activity commitment to, and DoN emphasis of, this 
priority. In their absence, these ultimately human factors wield a growing and 
detrimental effect over progress, funding requirements, and effective completion. 
The DoD-wide scope ofthe DPAS implementation also limits DoN's capability to 
influence the price and progress of the compliance initiative. With the DP AS transition 
ongoing across the military components and defense agencies, and the tremendous 
diversity of Personal Property reporting activities within them, DP AS cannot yet answer 
all user accounting, reporting, and mission requirements. The Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) controls modifications to DPAS, but a forum of DoD component and agency 
users, where DoN objectives must necessarily be compromised, prioritizes such 
upgrades. DLA time and personnel resource constraints affect DP AS modifications, but 
cost is not relevant, and thus provides no potential incentive to increase efficiencies. 
Also, further "upgrades" that increase functionality to meet other users' requirements 
may ironically exacerbate the already-noteworthy cumbersomeness attributed to DPAS 
operation for its multifunctional capacity. 
The correctness of the DoN decision to deploy DP AS to achieve compliance with 
federal financial management system requirements over attempting to modify hundreds 
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of stovepipe systems remains indisputable. However, the complexities of DP AS 
implementation, from its unprecedented extent to its disruptive cultural and procedural 
impact to its bureaucratic systems administration, threaten to render completion in FY 
2003 an improbable objective. 
3. National Defense 
a. Specific Conclusions 
This thesis repeatedly examined National Defense cost estimates and 
progress using the comparative framework of Real and Personal Property initiative 
assessments, which ostensibly represented the situational extremes confronting the 
implementation of nonfinancial feeder system solutions. This format provided a 
foundation upon which to consider the DoN National Defense PP&E compliance 
initiative. National Defense Assets presented the greatest complexity and challenge due 
to the lack of evaluations on existing systems and data, the lack of a functional 
replacement for them, and most importantly the lack of conclusive accounting and 
reporting standards. This thesis considers the undiminished magnitude and pervasiveness 
of the system, data, and accounting and reporting deficiencies in National Defense to 
jeopardize the credibility of the DoN financial management reform effort and the 
legitimacy of progress achieved on other, lesser fronts. We have saved the worst for last. 
During the course of conducting thesis research, the Navy selected to 
pursue implementation of the Data Warehouse Option over three other potentially viable 
alternatives under consideration. This decision was made with cognizance of the known 
legislative requirements for an integrated system capable of compliant interface with 
financial systems, but in the continued absence of any further conclusions regarding the 
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precise accounting and reporting standards to be adopted and enforced. After a 
comparative overview of all four compliance initiative alternatives, and again using Real 
and Personal Property initiatives as a framework for evaluation, this thesis concluded that 
implementation of the Data Warehouse Option constituted the best course of action for 
two principal reasons: 
1) It capitalizes on the intangible advantages gained in harnessing the 
participation of the operational communities, demonstrated in the Real 
Property initiative, by leaving existing, performing systems in place with 
minor modification and consolidation; and 
2) It avoids the potentially prohibitive costs and the certain operational 
disruption, as unavoidably experienced with consequent adverse impacts 
in the Personal Property initiative, of developing and/or imposing an 
unfamiliar replacement system upon those same communities. 
Mr. Greg Barber, the coordinator of all 13 DoN Implementation Strategy Working 
Groups under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller), succinctly characterized the Data Warehouse decision as "the path of least 
resistance:" [Ref. 33] it achieves federal requirements for integration, minimizes risk to 
current operations, and demonstrates progress within time and cost constraints. 
b. Proposal 
As a result of these conclusions, this thesis proposes a DoN strategic 
initiative to account for and report National Defense PP&E in the absence of federal 
accounting standards. Such an initiative might begin with a change in the definition of 
National Defense PP&E to further simplify the still-undeveloped parameters and 
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functional requirements for a data warehousing system. The current definition, as it is 
proposed, considers National Defense Assets: 
The PP&E components of weapon systems and support PP&E used by the 
Military Departments in the performance of military missions, and vessels 
held in preservation status by the Maritime Administration's National 
Defense Reserve Fleet [Ref. 34] 
Two observations arise: 
1) When considering the vast diversity of what might comprise a "military 
mission," and thus what support PP&E must then be considered National 
Defense Assets, the possibilities are veritably limitless across the PP&E 
spectrum; and 
2) Some weapon system components may arguably not be considered PP&E, 
and more appropriately accounted for as another form of asset. 
Referencing Tables 4-2 and 4-3, two categories of National Defense 
PP&E merit scrutiny under these considerations. First, Weapons Systems Support, as 
reported by DoN, is comprised solely of active ammunition bunkers, the purpose and 
nature of which is self-explanatory. These bunker buildings, associated structures, and 
surrounding land qualify in every respect as Real Property, and should be accounted for 
and reported as such. Second, Guided Self-Propelled Ordnance, comprised entirely of 
missiles and torpedoes, represents a high cost, high technology extension of a basic 
category of Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S), ammunition and munitions. 
Missiles and torpedoes likewise qualify in every respect in an alternate functional 
category, albeit as "smart" examples: their use is one-time and essentially instantaneous, 
with an expected shelf-life after which they are considered unusable if not expended, thus 
107 
preventing depreciation on any rational basis. As a result, they should be accounted for 
and reported as munitions, a component of Operating Materials and Supplies valued at 
latest acquisition cost and expensed using the consumption method of accounting for 
expense recognition. [Ref. 16:p. 61] This reclassification in no way affects safeguards or 
accountability measures. 
This material realignment of National Defense Assets permits the 
establishment of a vastly more concise definition, specifically limited to PP&E weapon 
systems platforms, weapons systems delivery platforms and components, and PP&E 
systems and components used by the Military Departments in support of such platforms. 
The remaining National Defense Assets, which all possess measurable service life 
expectancies and salvage value, and do not potentially belong in another redundant or 
overlapping asset category, may now be accounted for in a manner similar to that of 
Personal Property. Assets valued over an established capitalization threshold will be 
depreciated, and the remainder expensed. 
The rationale behind this concise National Defense Asset definition 
supports the accounting and reporting aspect of this proposal, an aspect that has and may 
continue to oppose DoD and DoN official positions and practices in this regard. 
Specifically, this thesis proposes that both the current inadequate reporting of National 
Defense Asset numbers and annual expenditures, and the SFF AS No. 8 additional 
reporting of either historical cost or latest acquisition cost, be discarded as fiscally 
irresponsible. In their place, National Defense PP&E accounting and reporting standards 
should rise to those required for General PP&E: 
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1) The recording of acquisition costs, to include costs incurred to establish 
full operational capability, and subsequent depreciation; or 
2) The estimation of costs, when historical cost of existing assets is 
indeterminable, based upon either the known historical cost of similar 
assets at acquisition or the current cost of similar assets adjusted for 
inflationary effects since the date of acquisition. 
Such a proposal comes with the recognition that the price of compliance 
will doubtlessly exponentially increase, due entirely to efforts required to establish or 
estimate historical costs and depreciation for current National Defense PP&E. Past 
estimates place the price for meeting this standard of accounting and reporting at up to 
$100 million for the DoD, and thus up to $50 million for the DoN, from a rough 
approximation of the percentage ofNational Defense Assets value controlled. While this 
amount may initially appear prohibitively expensive, it approximates only .19% of the 
total $26.202 billion DoN will spend on the procurement of National Defense Assets 
alone in FY 2001. [Ref. 35:App. B-1, B-11 - B-15] Additionally, consider that the 
proposed accounting and reporting standard represents the most stringent possible 
reporting requirements that the F ASAB might impose. Last, and perhaps most 
significant, consider the value the DoN might be willing to place on specific intangibles: 
unparalleled fmancial management system clarity and integrity among the DoD 
components and agencies; the trust and confidence of Congress, federal managers, and 
the American taxpayers for superior financial information and demonstrated 
accountability for the use of tax revenues; the enhanced capabilities of Navy operational 
commanders and senior leadership to make more proactive and more responsive 
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and resource requirements based firmly upon reliable, accurate, visible data. From the 
perspective of thesis conclusions, such an initiative appears to constitute a sound 
investment. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The magnitude and prioritization of financial management reform in general 
throughout the DoN and the DoD, and of nonfinancial feeder system reforms in 
particular, establishes a multitude of opportunities for valuable research at the forefront 
of a revolution in business affairs. Specific recommendations for research as a 
consequence of this thesis include: 
I) The "Y2K" process for nonfinancial feeder system compliance; 
2) Development of a full cost reporting methodology; 
3) Comparative analyses of subsequent compliance initiatives; and 
4) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. 
1. Y2K Process 
The Defense Management Council approved the establishment of a "Y2K" 
process at the DoD level to direct and monitor feeder system compliance initiatives, to 
ensure prioritization of measures that result in such systems meeting federal financial 
management requirements. Subsequently, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
directed the formation of the Financial Management Oversight Council to oversee the 
required efforts, with an additional subordinate supervisory layer, the Systems 
Compliance Working Group, instituted by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 
[Ref. 36, 37] The proposed Financial and Feeder System Compliance Process adds to the 
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previously imposed BFMIP structure a five-phase approach with defined phase exit 
criteria to achieve compliance. 
From the DoN perspective, these additional layers of bureaucracy raise distinct 
concerns. Navy progress, in many instances, already outpaces the structure of the 
process, having successfully skipped steps in previous phase definitions. For the DoN, 
the constraints potentially imposed by the process threaten to slow current reform 
momentum in unnecessary or cumbersome administration. Also, the Navy's unique 
collaborative efforts with government auditors and private sector accounting firms are not 
a component of the DoD process, with their absence opening the possibility for costly 
compliance initiatives to fail final validation tests. [Ref. 38] Thesis research examining 
the costs and benefits of the Y2K process implementation may have a material impact on 
the future progress, or lack thereof, in feeder system compliance. 
2. Full Cost Reporting 
As discussed in the context of this thesis, the complexities of program funding 
and budgetary accounting practices preclude determination of the full cost of 
implementing DoN nonfinancial feeder system reforms. This deficiency affects the full 
spectrum of transactions executed throughout the Navy, resulting in fmancial data still 
based upon budgetary obligations, disbursements, and collection transactions, as well as 
other cash basis measures. No adequate capability exists to separate the direct or indirect 
labor costs of military or civilian personnel, specific materiel costs, overhead and 
common costs, or non-recurring costs outside appropriation groups and General Fund 
activities for monitoring budget execution. Thesis research on the conceptualization or 
development of a methodology or system to collect and report fmancial information on a 
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full cost accrual basis by program and across appropriation groups may prove material to 
the Navy's preliminary efforts to comply with SFF AS requirements for cost information 
and potentially revolutionize cost estimation capabilities. 
3. Subsequent Initiative Comparisons 
This thesis' examination of the price and progress of DoN nonfinancial feeder 
system compliance initiatives is by no means conclusive, rather representing an initial 
inquiry into a dynamic reform effort of paramount importance in the establishment of 
auditable fmancial statements and a sustainable, integrated financial management system. 
The efforts of ten other DoN Working Groups, currently underway addressing issues 
identified in the BFMIP and the DoD Implementation Strategies for auditable fmancial 
statements and integrated fmancial systems, fell beyond the scope of this thesis, as well 
as comparable reform efforts by other Military Components and defense agencies. 
Further thesis research on these and subsequent compliance initiatives, potentially using 
this thesis' methodology for comparative analysis, may provide a perspective or 
independent assessment resulting in improvements among future initiatives and providing 
a vehicle for addressing controversial or entrenched problems remaining. 
4. Enterprise Resource Planning Systems 
Currently, despite selection of the Data Warehouse Option over the ERP option 
among National Defense PP&E alternative approaches, the DoN possesses a strong focus 
toward the ERP fully integrated systems approach as a complement and perhaps ultimate 
successor to current efforts. Such a system would enable the automation and integration 
of business processes, using common data, throughout the Navy. [Ref. 17:p. 26] Ms. 
Gladys Commons, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial 
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Management and Comptroller), stated that ERP is conceptually exactly what the DoN is 
looking for in terms of its full spectrum integration, rendering the system transparent to 
all disparate operational communities. [Ref. 39] 
ERP projects in the private sector have yielded tremendous results in terms of 
both operational and management performance, and high priority ERP pilot projects are 
now underway within DoN at NAVAIR, NAVSEA, SPA WAR, and the Navy Working 
Capital Fund. Thesis research conducting an objective, comparative analysis of the 
approaches, progress, and outcomes of the respective pilot projects may represent a major 
contribution to long-term DoN efforts to implement a Navy-wide ERP paradigm for 
processes and systems. 
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